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A Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Many observers believe that the executive labor market in the U.S. functions 
poorly.1  At many public companies, senior executives exert excessive influence over 
the pay-setting process, and the outside directors who are charged with negotiating pay 
arrangements on behalf of shareholders lack the tools and incentives to bargain 
effectively.2  Given the interconnectedness of the market, even well-governed firms 
must augment pay in order to attract and retain talented executives.3  The result, under 
this view, is systematic market failure with executives receiving more compensation 
across the board than they would in a well-functioning market.4 
 
 This Article accepts the premise of market failure and considers potential 
regulatory responses.  To the extent that commentators have focused on regulatory 
responses to date, their proposals generally have been aimed at improving the pay-
setting process by, for example, increasing board independence or giving shareholders 
greater influence over the process.5  These are admirable goals, but this Article takes a 
more direct tack.  After all, despite improvements in board composition and processes 
and in the transparency of executive pay disclosures, there has been no apparent 
slackening in the growth of executive pay. 
 
 This Article focuses specifically on the issue of excessive pay levels that result 
from deficiencies in the executive labor market.6  Excessive compensation is 
objectionable on several grounds.  First, and most obviously, it strikes many as unfair 
that executives receive more compensation than they would in a well-functioning 
                                                 
 
1 Lucian Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive 
Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002); GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (Norton 
1991); Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. 
POL’Y 2, 283 (2005); Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein & Urs Peyer, Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors, 
65 J. FIN. 2363 (2009); Lucian Bebchuk & Robert Jackson, Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823 
(2005); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Agents With and Without Principals, AM. ECON. 
REV., May 2000, at 203 [hereinafter, Agents]; Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs 
Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are, 116 Q. J. ECON. 901 (2001) [hereinafter, CEOs]. 
2 Bebchuk et al., supra note X, at 766-74; Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note X, at 300-02; Bebchuk, 
Grinstein & Peyer, supra note X, at 2373-82; Bertrand & Mullainathan, Agents, supra note X, at 208. 
3 Bebchuk et al., supra note X, at 840-42; Bertrand & Mullainathan, CEOs, supra note X, at 916, 929. 
4 Bebchuk et al., supra note X; Bertrand & Mullainathan, CEOs, supra note X. 
5 Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43 (2003); Ran Duchin 
et al., When Are Outside Directors Effective?, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (2010); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier 
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
863, 873 (1991); Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and 
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283 (1998); Randall S. 
Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate Management by Expanding Statutory Access 
to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331 (1996); Robert C. Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the 
Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too (Harvard John M. Olin 
Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 525, 2005), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Clark_525.pdf.  
6 Other commentators have focused on the impact of executive labor market deficiencies on 
compensation design.  Bebchuk et al., supra note X , at 786-91 (arguing that executive compensation is 
structured to camouflage pay and limit outrage); Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note X, at 831. 
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market, and it is likely that excessive executive pay has contributed in a significant 
way to the growing inequality of wealth in this country.7  Second, from an efficiency 
perspective, one can think of excessive executive pay as an economic tax on 
investment in the corporate sector that inefficiently distorts capital allocation.8 
 
 Recognizing the existence of a problem and coming up with an effective solution 
are two different matters, however.  Most commentators have shied away from the 
idea of capping executive pay, and for good reason:  Regulators do not have sufficient 
information to effectively cap executive pay without creating massive inefficiencies.9  
On the other hand, this Article argues that taxation might be a valuable tool for 
mitigating the adverse effects of excessive executive pay. 
 
 This Article proposes and analyzes a two-pronged tax response to the problem of 
excessive executive pay – the imposition of a surtax on executive pay in excess of a 
threshold combined with investor tax relief.  If we assume that a surtax would have no 
impact on behavior, the imposition of a surtax would reduce the after-tax income of 
executives, which would directly respond to the unfairness of excessive pay and the 
effect of excessive pay on inequality of resources.  Investor tax relief would tend to 
reverse the inefficient distortion in capital allocation that results from excessive pay.   
 
 It would be a mistake, of course, to blindly assume that a surtax would have no 
impact on behavior, but this Article argues that distortions created by a surtax are 
likely to be minor.  Evidence on the elasticity of executive labor supply and taxable 
income suggests that a modest surtax on executive pay would have little impact on 
hours worked or on taxable income.  By these measures, an executive pay surtax 
would be a relatively non-distorting and efficient tax.  However, experience with other 
tax penalties directed at executive pay – in particular the “golden parachute” tax – 
suggests that a portion of the surtax might be passed on to investors through increases 
in pre-tax compensation.  Any shifting in incidence would undermine the objectives of 
the surtax.  There are reasons to think that executives’ ability to shift would be limited, 
and shifting could be mitigated by raising surtax rates, but shifting is a concern with a 
surtax proposal.   
 
 In addition, firms and executives might seek to restructure compensation to blunt 
the impact of the surtax.  It is even possible that some public companies might go 
private or that private companies would be dissuaded from going public as a result of a 
surtax that was limited to public company executives.  However, this Article argues 
that none of these concerns would be particularly serious or insurmountable. 
 
 Several forms of investor tax relief could effectively mitigate the inefficient 
distortion of investment that follows from the extraction by executives of excessive 
compensation.  This Article considers both general and firm-specific relief targeted at 
                                                 
 
7 See supra note X and accompanying text. 
8 See supra note X and accompanying text. 
9 See supra note X and accompanying text. 
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the corporate and investor level.  Given uncertainty as to who bears the cost of 
excessive executive pay and a variety of practical concerns, this Article argues that 
corporate tax relief would be preferable.   
 
 Of course, investor tax relief need not necessarily be linked to the imposition of a 
surtax on executive pay.  Either regulatory response could be pursued independently.  
However, this Article makes the case for a combined approach, principally because of 
the risk that a portion of the surtax could be passed on to investors.  “Refunding” the 
surtax proceeds to investors would ensure that distortions in investment were 
mitigated, and not exacerbated, by the imposition of a surtax. 
 
 The remainder of this Article is organized as follows.  Part II describes a 
conception of the executive pay problem that motivates the regulatory responses that 
follow and provides a basis for their evaluation.  This Part clearly lays out the negative 
consequences of excessive executive pay as well as the factors that purportedly result 
in market failure.  Part III considers the first prong of a tax response – a surtax on 
executive pay – showing how a surtax would respond to the concerns associated with 
excessive compensation and demonstrating that the distortions created by a surtax 
would be minimal and manageable.  Part IV takes up the investor tax relief prong of 
the proposal and is concerned primarily with the tradeoffs involved in designing 
investor relief.   
 
 Part V considers regulatory alternatives, with a particular focus on coercive 
regulation, such as pay caps.  A considerable advantage of coercive regulation over the 
two-pronged tax response is that a pay cap is more difficult to avoid.  However, the 
potential downsides of one-size-fits-all coercive regulation are simply too great for this 
approach to be seriously considered.  The superiority of a combination of a surtax and 
investor tax relief as a regulatory response to the executive pay problem is reiterated in 
Part VI, which concludes the Article.  In addition, this Part suggests that the arguments 
made in favor of a surtax could also be used to bolster the case for a very different 
regulatory reform that would not be addressed specifically at the executive pay 
problem, that is, increasing tax rates at the high end of the income distribution 
generally.    
 
 
II.THE EXECUTIVE PAY PROBLEM 
 
 
A. The Magnitude of U.S. Executive Pay and the Increase over Time 
 
 Executive compensation in the U.S. is high in both relative and absolute terms, is 
economically significant, and has increased markedly during the last several decades.  
According to a recent report, the median value of 2010 CEO compensation at the 350 
largest U.S. public companies was $9.3 million, an increase of over 10% from the 
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temporarily reduced pay levels seen during the financial crisis.10  Public company 
CEO pay has increased in real terms by 500% or more over the last 30 years.11   
 
 The growth of executive pay can also be seen in the growing disparity between top 
executive pay and the compensation of rank and file workers.12  In 1980, the ratio of 
average CEO pay to average rank and file worker pay was 42 to 1.  By 1990, that ratio 
had increased to 100 to 1.  At the peak of the dot-com bubble in 2000, the ratio 
exceeded 500 to 1.  The ratio declined as executive pay moderated during the financial 
crisis, but even in 2009 it continued to exceed 250 to 1.  The compensation of other 
senior executives has also risen dramatically over this period, much more substantially 
than the pay of rank and file workers, although not as dramatically as CEO pay.13 
 
 Executive pay is economically significant.  U.S. public companies are required to 
disclose in their annual proxy statements compensation data for their “top five” 
executives, currently defined as the CEO, CFO, and three most highly compensated 
executives other than the CEO and CFO.  S&P’s Execucomp database collects this 
data for executives at over 2000 public companies.14  For 2008, aggregate executive 
compensation for roughly 10,000 Execucomp executives totaled $25 billion, an 
average of about $2.5 million per top executive.15   
 
 Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein collected similar data for Execucomp listed 
executives over the 1993 to 2003 period, and they also estimated pay for U.S. public 
companies with market capitalization in excess of $50 million that were not listed on 
Execucomp.16  For the entire period, they estimated that top executive pay constituted 
                                                 
 
10 Joann S. Lublin, CEO Pay in 2010 Jumped 11%, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2011, at B1 (reporting data 
compiled by the Hay Group). Average pay for this group of CEOs was $10.6 million.  Hay Group, The 
Wall Street Journal/Hay Group Survey of CEO Compensation, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2011, 
http://graphicsweb.wsj.com/php/CEOPAY11.html.  See also Pradnya Joshi, We Knew They Got Raises. 
But This?, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2011, at BU1 (reporting on data from Equilar indicating that median 
2010 pay for CEOs of 200 large public companies was $10.8 million).  CEO compensation is highly 
correlated with firm size.  Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR 
ECONOMICS 2485, 2493 (Orley Ashenfelter ed., Elsevier 1999).  Thus, it is not surprising that median 
pay for the largest 200 companies would be significantly greater than median pay for the 350 largest 
companies.   
11 Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much, 123 Q. J. ECON. 49, 51 
(2008) (finding a 500% increase); Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New 
View from a Long-Run Perspective, 1936-2005, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2099, 2107 (2010) (finding an 
increase of over 500%). 
12 The following pay ratio data was retrieved from the AFL-CIO website. Executive Pay Watch: Trends 
in CEO Pay, http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/paywatch/pay/index.cfm (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
13 Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation, 2 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 75, 77-80 (2010). 
14 The Execucomp universe includes current and former members of the S&P 1500. 
15 All the data reported herein are based on the Execucomp variable TDC1.  TDC1 is a grant date 
measure of executive pay and includes salary, bonus payments, long term incentive payouts, perks, and 
the grant date value of stock options and restricted stock.  Execucomp also includes a rough measure of 
realized compensation, coded as TDC2.  TDC2 replaces grant date option values with realized option 
values.  For this group of executives, aggregate compensation as measured by TDC2 for 2008 was 
$28.4 billion. 
16 Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note X. 
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6.6% of the aggregate earnings of these companies.17  More importantly, however, 
they showed that this fraction was increasing over time.  Between 1993 and 1995, top 
executive pay absorbed only about 5% of earnings.  Between 2001 and 2003, the 
fraction of earnings devoted to top executive pay had increased to almost 10%.18 
 
 Bebchuk and Grinstein estimated that top executive pay at non-Execucomp firms 
with market capitalization in excess of $50 million was, in aggregate, about two-thirds 
of executive pay reported in Execucomp.19  Assuming that this relationship still holds, 
a ballpark estimate for 2008 top executive pay for U.S. public companies with market 
capitalization in excess of $50 million would be about $40 billion.20  Note, moreover, 
that these figures include only the top five executives at each company.  There are 
likely to be more than five “senior” executives at many large, public companies, and 
thus this figure likely understates the aggregate amount of senior executive pay.  Also, 
bear in mind that these figures represent annual flows to company executives, not one-
time transfers. 
 
 Obviously, public company executives would receive considerable compensation 
in a well-functioning managerial labor market.  Reciting the current levels of and 
growth in executive pay does not establish the degree of excessive compensation or 
even the fact of excessive compensation, but rather provides a base against which 
one’s perception of excess may be gauged.  
 
B. Explaining Excessive Executive Pay 
 
 This Article is predicated on an assumption of market failure in the public 
company executive pay setting process.  Its aim is to consider regulatory responses – 
in particular, a tax response – given that assumption.  This Article is not intended to 
reopen the debate concerning the efficiency of this market,21 but in order to evaluate 
potential responses, it is necessary to understand in what ways the executive labor 
market may be deficient.  This section will briefly review the efficient (sometimes 
called “optimal”) contracting view of the process and the managerial power view 
described by Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, and myself.22  Of course, one may 
conclude that the executive labor market is less than fully efficient, but that the 
managerial power view is not an adequate description.  In such a case, some of the 
                                                 
 
17 Id. at 297.  
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 $25 billion aggregate compensation for Execucomp executives plus 2/3 x $25 billion = $41.7 billion.  
Bebchuk and Grinstein’s data are reported in 2002 dollars.  The $50 million cutoff would be somewhat 
higher in 2008 dollars. 
21 For an overview of the debate, see Symposium, Management and Control of the Modern Business 
Corporation, 69 CHI. L. REV. 729 (2002); John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. 
CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (reviewing LUCIAN 
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION (2004). 
22 Bebchuk et al., supra note X. 
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analyses and prescriptions that follow might require modification.  For the bulk of the 
analysis, however, the critical assumption is market failure, not the descriptive 
accuracy of a particular model of market failure. 
                                                
 
 The traditional conception of the executive pay setting process is the optimal 
contracting view first set forth by Michael Jensen and William Meckling.23  Under 
their model, a board of directors that cannot perfectly observe the effort, focus, and 
effectiveness of its agent (the CEO) negotiates a contract that minimizes agency costs, 
which include the costs of 1) monitoring the executive, 2) bonding by the executive to 
maximize shareholder value, and 3) the residual divergence between the actions 
selected by the executive and share value maximizing actions.24  Most of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on executive pay proceeds from the assumption that 
these arrangements are selected to minimize agency costs and maximize shareholder 
value. 
 
 However, many observed features of the executive pay landscape appear to be 
inconsistent with the share value maximizing, or optimal contracting, model of the 
executive pay process.25  An alternative, managerial power view of the executive pay 
setting process posits that the outside directors who are charged with negotiating 
executive pay lack the proper incentives and tools to bargain effectively and that their 
independence is undermined by executive influence over the board and as well as by 
board dynamics that discourage dissent.26  Under this view, executive pay is not 
simply a tool to combat agency costs; it is a product of the agency problem.27  The 
managerial power view does not suggest that there are no constraints on executive pay.  
Under this view, the threat or reality of investor and financial press outrage plays an 
important role in disciplining compensation.     
 
 Of course, the managerial power view and the optimal contracting view of the pay 
setting process may co-exist, providing relatively more or less explanatory power at 
particular firms.28  Moreover, under both theories there is an overriding cap on 
managerial value extraction that is determined by external market forces – markets for 
corporate control, capital, products, and even the managerial labor market.  However, 
 
 
23 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
24 Id.  Some degree of agency cost is unavoidable in the modern, widely-held corporation. 
25 BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note X; Bebchuk et al., supra note X; 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSP., Summer 2003, at 71; Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note X; Core, Guay & Thomas, supra note X; 
Frydman & Jenter, supra note X, at 89-94. 
26 Bebchuk et al., supra note X. 
27 Bebchuk et al., supra note X. 
28 Bebchuk et al., supra note X. A third view characterizes the compensation setting process as a team 
production problem in which the board serves as a mediating hierarch between competing stakeholders 
– the executives, employees, creditors, and shareholders – who make firm-specific investments in the 
company.  This theory predicts that compensation arrangements would not be designed to maximize 
shareholder value, but to balance the interests of the stakeholders.  See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. 
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). 
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proponents of the managerial power view argue that these external market forces 
permit considerable slack, leaving one to question the extent to which such forces 
actually limit executive rent extraction.29 
 
 The managerial power view of the executive pay setting process suggests two 
major sources of inefficiency.  The focus of much of the literature is on the distortions 
in compensation design that follow from an outrage constraint and the attendant 
costs.30  Under the managerial power view, transparency and salience of pay are 
critical.  If all channels of compensation were perfectly transparent and equally salient 
to investors, compensation design would be irrelevant under this model.  Outrage 
would simply be a function of total appropriation, and, although total pay would 
remain excessive, firms would select compensation elements so as to minimize agency 
costs and maximize shareholder value.  But appropriation is not transparent.  
Managers may be able to increase their pay by camouflaging compensation and 
avoiding outrage.  Doing so, however, results in compensation choices that are not 
share value maximizing.31 
 
 This Article is focused on a second source of inefficiency.  This inefficiency, 
which is more fully described in section C below, arises from the transfer to executives 
of excessive compensation and the distortions in investment behavior that result.  In all 
likelihood, there is both a systematic and a firm-specific element to excessive 
compensation.  Managers, boards, and negotiating processes are heterogeneous.  Some 
boards may negotiate effectively with respect to executive pay.  Importantly, however, 
as long as executives receive excessive pay at a substantial number of companies, pay 
levels will be systematically higher.   
 
 The reason is that companies do not set pay levels in a vacuum.  Guided by 
compensation consultants whose primary role is to collect and summarize executive 
pay data, companies set compensation based on the pay practices of their peers, a 
process known as “benchmarking.”32  As a result, lax pay practices at some firms tend 
to drive up executive pay levels generally.  The problem is made worse by the Lake 
Wobegon effect.33  Because no board believes (or is willing to publicly admit) that its 
executives are below average, firms generally seek to pay their executives at or above 
                                                 
 
29 Bebchuk et al., supra note X.  For example, it seems quite clear that given the defensive mechanisms 
available to target management, the hostile takeover market would provide little disciplinary force on 
senior executive pay.  See Henry G. Manne, Bring Back the Hostile Takeover, WALL ST. J., June 26, 
2002, at A18. 
30 BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note X, at 64-66; Bebchuk & Fried, Agency 
Problem, supra note X, at 75-76; Bebchuk et al., supra note X, at 786-88; Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra 
note X, at 300-01; Core, Guay & Thomas, supra note X. 
31 Bebchuk et al., supra note X. 
32 See Bizjak et al., Does the Use of Peer Groups Contribute to Higher Pay and Less Efficient 
Compensation?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 152 (2008). 
33 Lake Wobegon, of course, is radio personality Garrison Keillor’s mythical Minnesota community 
where “all the children are above average.”  See http://prairiehome.publicradio.org/.  
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the 50th percentile of peer executive compensation.34  This practice of benchmarking 
with targets at or above the 50th percentile leads to upward ratcheting in executive 
pay.35  Perversely, the upward ratcheting problem may have been exacerbated by 
enhanced executive compensation disclosure requirements promulgated by the SEC 
over the last twenty years.  Evidence suggests that enhanced disclosure may have done 
more to increase below average elements of pay at lagging firms than to reduce above 
average elements at “leading” firms.36  The result, as my colleague Fred Tung recently 
suggested to me, is “market failure with an arms race.” 
 
 In sum, the managerial power view posits that executives extract rents as a result 
of inadequate bargaining by outside directors and slack in the capital, products, and 
corporate control markets.  The effect of excessive compensation is felt even at well-
governed firms given the prevalence of benchmarking, and the impact is exacerbated 
by enhanced disclosure and upward ratcheting.  Nonetheless, despite benchmarking 
and ratcheting, there is heterogeneity in executive pay.  Of course it is difficult to 
pinpoint the degree of excess compensation in any particular case, but some executive 
pay packages appear clearly excessive even as a relative matter.37   
 
C. The Negative Consequences of Excessive Executive Pay 
 
 As noted in the previous section, the managerial power view predicts that 
compensation design will be distorted as managers seek to minimize outrage and 
maximize their pay.  Such distortions are obviously inefficient.  This section addresses 
another set of inefficiencies that relate more directly to the increased transfer of value 
from companies to executives that results from market failure.  It begins by 
                                                 
 
34 Bizjak et al., supra note X, at 153 (finding that the vast majority of S&P 500 firms sampled 
“target[ed] pay levels at or above the 50th percentile of the peer group”).  In addition, companies often 
select peer groups with an eye towards justifying high executive pay levels.  See Michael Faulkender & 
Jun Yang, Inside the Black Box: The Role and Composition of Compensation Peer Groups, 96 J. FIN. 
ECON. 257, 259 (2010); John Bizjak et al, Are All CEOs Above Average? An Empirical Analysis of 
Compensation Peer Groups and Pay Design, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 538 (2011). 
35 Bizjak et al., supra note X, at 155. 
36 For example, Grinstein, Weinbaum, and Yehuda find that after enhanced disclosure requirements for 
perks, firms that provided a low level of perks compared with their peers increased perks in the second 
year after enhanced disclosure was mandated, while firms that provided a relatively high level of perks 
did not reduce them.  The authors provide additional evidence suggesting that the increase in perks by 
formerly low-perk firms reflected actual ratcheting rather than simply increased disclosure.  Yaniv 
Grinstein et al., The Economic Consequences of Perk Disclosure (Johnson Sch. Res. Paper Series, No. 
06-2011, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108707. 
37 Outliers exist at both the high and low ends of the executive pay spectrum.  See, e.g., Gretchen 
Morgenson, The Best and the Worst in Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 17, 2006, § 3, at 1; Daniel 
Costello, The Drought Is Over (at Least for C.E.O.’s), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2011, at BU1 (describing 
excessive CEO pay packages in 2010, including Viacom CEO Philippe Dauman who made $84.5 
million for nine months of work); Sophia J.W. Hamm et al., One Dollar CEO Salaries: An Empirical 
Examination of the Determinants and Consequences (Apr. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript, available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1796403) (examining CEOs who receive $1/year salaries, finding that a 
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considering who bears the cost of this transfer.  It follows by examining the effect of 
this transfer on investment in the corporate sector, on executive labor markets outside 
the public company context, and on the growing inequality of wealth in the U.S. 
 
1. Who Bears the Cost of Excessive Executive Compensation? 
 
 Corporate governance experts assume, explicitly or implicitly, that excessive 
executive pay comes at the expense of shareholders who bear residual corporate gains 
or losses.38  Certainly this is true in the first instance.  But the question is whether the 
burden is shifted as shareholders respond to reduced returns in the corporate sector.  
As I discuss at greater length elsewhere,39 the assumption that shareholders bear the 
burden over both the short and the long term seems reasonable to the extent that 
executive pay is high at a particular company because of a particularly strong 
executive or a particularly ineffective board.  It would be difficult for shareholders to 
pass on the cost of excessive pay in that situation to consumers or labor.   
 
 But it is less obvious that shareholders bear the long-term cost of executive pay 
that is higher across the board than it would be if the optimal contracting model 
provided a complete picture of pay practices.  Systematically higher pay that results 
from lax governance at some firms, comparative benchmarking, and an executive 
labor pool that is infected by these practices might be analogized to a corporate level 
income tax.  Like an actual tax, the economic tax created by systematically excessive 
pay reduces net shareholder returns, which may have an effect on the allocation of 
capital.  If the analogy is sound, one might look to the extensive literature on the 
incidence of the corporate income tax for clues as to whether, or how, the cost of 
systematically excessive pay might be shifted.   
 
 Unfortunately, both the theoretical and empirical literatures on the incidence of the 
corporate income tax are inconclusive.  Nonetheless, this literature suggests that it 
would be a mistake to assume that shareholders bear the entire long-term cost of an 
increase in the corporate tax rate and, if the analogy is sound, of a systematic increase 
in excessive executive pay.   
 
a. Corporate Income Tax Incidence: Theory and Evidence 
 
 Early theoretical work on the incidence of the corporate income tax employed a 
closed economy general equilibrium model that included two sectors – corporate and 
non-corporate – and two factors of production – labor and capital.40  The result under 
this model is that the incidence of a corporate tax, and, by extension, the incidence of 
systematically excessive executive pay falls not solely on shareholders but on all 
                                                 
 
38 E.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note X, at 785. 
39 David I. Walker, Who Bears the Cost of Excessive Executive Compensation? (June 23, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
40 Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215 (1962). 
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holders of capital in the economy.41  Joel Slemrod and Jon Bakija explain the model 
by analogizing to the imposition of a toll on one of two parallel highways.42  At first, 
those who drive on the road with the new toll bear the entire cost. However, over time, 
drivers abandon the toll road for the non-tolled road, which increases congestion and 
the cost of using the non-tolled road and reduces the congestion and cost of using the 
tolled road.  In equilibrium, the total cost of driving on the toll and non-toll roads must 
be the same.  Similarly, when a tax is imposed on investors in one sector of the 
economy, reducing returns to that sector, capital will shift into the non-taxed sector, 
depressing returns in that sector and increasing returns in the taxed sector, until after-
tax returns equilibrate.43   
  
 This model of corporate tax incidence is quite elegant but its assumption of a 
closed economy and fixed factors of production is unrealistic.  Most of the theoretical 
work in recent years has been focused on exploring the incidence question under more 
realistic, open economy assumptions.44  Under these models, if one assumes that 
capital is perfectly mobile internationally and that domestic and foreign traded goods 
are perfect substitutes, the incidence of an increase in the corporate tax, and by 
analogy of a systematic increase in excessive executive pay, falls primarily on the 
immobile factor of production – domestic labor.45  The idea is that wages are based on 
the productivity of labor, which is a function of invested capital.  So if capital moves 
abroad, foreign workers are better off, but domestic workers suffer.   
 
 However, incidence under these models is highly dependent on one’s assumptions.  
If foreign and domestic traded goods are not perfect substitutes, the open economy 
model begins to look like the closed economy model and capital is predicted to bear 
the bulk of the burden rather than labor.46   
 
 To complicate the theoretical incidence analysis further, Alan Auerbach has 
suggested several reasons that shareholders might be unable to shift the burden of a 
corporate tax under any of these models.47  For example, to the extent that the 
                                                 
 
41 Id. 
42 JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 
79-80 (4th ed. 2008). 
43 One may ask why workers bear none of the burden under the closed economy model.  The answer, in 
a nutshell, is that the model assumes that workers receive pay equal to the marginal product of their 
labor and that the marginal product is a function of the amount of capital invested in the economy.  
Under this model, the total amount of capital invested in the economy is fixed and thus total returns to 
labor are fixed.  See Harberger, supra note X, at 216. 
44 Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know, in 20 TAX POL’Y AND 
THE ECON. 1 (James M. Poterba ed., 2006); Jane G. Gravelle & Kent A. Smetters, Does the Open 
Economy Assumption Really Mean That Labor Bears the Burden of a Capital Income Tax?, ADVANCES 
IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, 2006 Issue 1, art. 3; William C. Randolph, International Burdens of the 
Corporate Income Tax (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper No. 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/75xx/doc7503/2006-09.pdf. 
45 Randolph, supra note X, at 26. 
46 Gravelle & Smetters, supra note X, at 10-12. 
47 Auerbach, supra note X, at 1. 
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corporate tax is a tax on economic rents, such as monopoly profits, or on other 
advantages that are specific to the corporate form, shareholders will not be able to shift 
the burden of the tax.48  As Altshuler, Harris, and Toder suggest, given Auerbach’s 
insights, it is possible that shareholders bear most (or even all) of the long-run costs 
associated with an increase in the corporate income tax.49 
 
 Given the indeterminacy of the theoretical literature on corporate tax incidence, 
several economists have attempted to get at the question from an empirical angle.  
Most have found that an increase in corporate tax rates burdens labor, at least to some 
extent.50  Unfortunately, empirical work in this area is also subject to criticism, and no 
economist that I am aware of considers the matter settled. 
 
b. Is the Corporate Tax Incidence Analogy Sound? 
 
 Setting aside the indeterminacy of the theoretical and empirical results for a 
moment, we must consider whether the analogy between corporate tax incidence and 
the incidence of systematically excessive executive pay is reasonably sound.  
Consideration of the various underlying assumptions suggests that it is.  An important 
assumption in maintaining the analogy between the corporate income tax and 
systematically excessive executive pay under the closed economy model is that the 
executive pay excesses do not infect the entire economy.  In other words, it is 
important that investors be able to avoid an increase in executive pay by shifting 
capital to other sectors.  This seems to be a reasonable assumption.  There would seem 
to be numerous domestic investment sectors, such as real estate, that would not be 
tainted by excessive executive pay. 
 
 Another important assumption is that markets other than the executive labor 
market are reasonably efficient.  There is little reason to think that market failure in the 
executive pay setting process results in inefficiencies in the products, capital, or (non-
executive) labor markets.51 
 
 Moreover, the analogy between the corporate tax and excessive executive pay 
appears to remain strong as we move from a closed to an open economy setting.  A 
systematic increase in U.S. executive pay that reduces returns on domestic shares 
should lead to an exodus of capital that reduces domestic wage rates in equilibrium.  
The degree to which this will be the case, and the degree to which domestic capital and 
                                                 
 
48 Id., at 25-28. 
49 Rosanne Altshuler et al., Capital Income Taxation and Progressivity in a Global Economy, 30 VA. 
TAX REV. 355, 361 (2010). 
50 Mihir A. Desai et al., Dividend Policy Inside the Multinational Firm, Fin. Mgmt., Spring 2007, at 5; 
Kevin A. Hassett & Aparna Mathur, Taxes and Wages, (Mar. 6, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://www.aei.org/paper/24063). 
51 Although senior executives have an obvious interest in maximizing their own compensation, their 
interest in holding down non-executive labor costs should be similar to the shareholders’ interest. .    
Bebchuk et al., supra note X, at 774; Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ 
Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 553-57 (1984).  
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labor bear the burden, would depend on the substitutability of foreign and domestic 
traded goods just as it does in the corporate tax incidence analysis.   
 
 An open economy model would collapse into a closed economy model if changes 
in systematically excessive U.S. executive pay were matched abroad,52 but despite the 
fact that executives are more mobile internationally than rank and file workers, cross-
country differences in executive compensation suggest that there is not a global 
executive labor market.  Despite signs of growing convergence, cross country 
comparisons of pay practices suggest that U.S. executive pay remains exceptional, 
with U.S. executives receiving more compensation than their international peers at 
comparably sized companies and with U.S. executives receiving a much larger fraction 
of their compensation in the form of equity.53  These differences do not in themselves 
confirm that U.S. executive pay is excessive.  Some commentators have suggested that 
because of differences in ownership structure and/or culture, executive talent may be 
more important to the success or failure of firms in the U.S. than abroad.54  
Nonetheless, increases or decreases in systematically excessive executive pay in the 
U.S. are unlikely to be matched overseas. 
 
 In sum, setting aside the special cases discussed by Auerbach, the consensus of 
economists is that the burden of the corporate income tax in an open economy is 
shifted to a significant degree to non-corporate capital and to labor.  But at that point 
the consensus ends.  If the analogy between the corporate income tax and 
systematically excessive executive pay is sound from an incidence perspective, the 
incidence of the latter is indeterminate as well.  Nonetheless, it is important to 
recognize that we should not simply assume that corporate shareholders bear the entire 
long-run cost of systematically excessive executive pay.  Some and perhaps most of 
that cost may be passed on as shareholders shift their capital elsewhere in search of 
greater returns. 
                                                 
 
52 It is well recognized that the open economy corporate tax incidence models collapse into a closed 
economy model if all countries raise and lower corporate tax rates together.  Matthew H. Jensen & 
Aparna Mathur, Corporate Tax Burden on Labor: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 2011 Tax Notes 
Today 111-13 (May 10, 2011), at 1083. 
53 See Brian J. Hall, Incentive Strategy II: Executive Compensation and Ownership Structure 6,7 
(Harvard Business School Case Study, 2002) (providing data demonstrating greater total pay and 
greater equity pay for U.S. executives than for executives of similarly sized firms abroad but arguing 
that U.S. style pay practices are spreading internationally); Nuno Fernandes et al., The Pay Divide: 
(Why) Are U.S. Top Executives Paid More? (Dec. 17, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341639) (finding that U.S. executives are paid more than their foreign 
counterparts and receive more equity pay but concluding that the differences are largely explained by 
firm, ownership, and board characteristics and by the riskiness of equity-based compensation); Randall 
S. Thomas, International Executive Pay: Current Practices and Future Trends 8 (Vanderbilt Law Sch. 
Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 26, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265122) 
(demonstrating that non-U.S. executives receive less total compensation and less performance-oriented 
pay, but also providing evidence of a shift towards U.S. pay practices).   
54 See Bebchuk et al., supra note X, at 842-3; Susan J. Stabile, My Executive Makes More Than Your 
Executive: Rationalizing Executive Pay in a Global Economy, 14 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 63, 67 n.18 (2001) 
(citing  IRA T. KAY, CEO PAY AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE: HELPING THE U.S. WIN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC WAR 25) (1998). 
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2. Effect of Excessive Executive Pay on Corporate Investment 
 
 The incidence discussion from the previous subsection tells us something about the 
distribution of the burden of systematically excessive pay extracted by executives.  
The effect of these transfers on the inequality of wealth in the U.S. is discussed in 
subsection 4 below.  This subsection considers the economic inefficiency that is 
associated with the transfer of excessive executive pay. 
 
 To the extent that shareholders are unable to pass the cost of excess compensation 
on through reallocation of capital, the result is a pure transfer.  For example, if an 
increase in excessive executive pay reduces monopoly rents, it will not distort 
investment.  Executives will simply capture a greater share of those rents, and 
investors a smaller share of those rents, than they did previously.  However, to the 
extent that reduced returns on company shares cause shareholders to re-allocate capital 
elsewhere, excess executive pay acts as a brake on domestic corporate investment.  
Under the closed economy model, capital shifts out of the corporate sector and into the 
non-corporate sector.  Under the open economy models, capital may shift abroad.  
Induced solely by excessive executive pay, these distortions are inefficient. 
 
 How exactly does this work?  In the short run, of course, unexpected increases in 
excessive pay, say from an exogenous shock that loosens the outrage constraint,55 are 
likely to be borne by existing shareholders.  But over the long run, the prospect of 
excessive pay should be taken into consideration at the initial public offering stage, 
leading to fewer companies entering the public markets, because of the systematic 
nature of the excessive pay problem and the difficulty that promoters would have in 
bonding themselves to not taking an (inflated) market level of compensation.  The 
prospect of excessive executive pay also would make it more expensive to raise money 
through a secondary stock offering, but secondary offerings are fairly rare occurrences 
for a variety of reasons.56  In sum, to the extent that domestic corporate shareholders 
reallocate capital and do not bear the entire burden of systematically excessive 
executive pay, the extraction of that pay acts as an inefficient encumbrance on 
domestic corporate investment.57 
                                                 
 
55 For example, Bebchuk & Grinstein posit that the bull market of the 1990s loosened the outrage 
constraint which permitted executives to increase their compensation. Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 
X, at 300-01. 
56 Secondary stock offerings are generally thought to suffer from an adverse selection or “lemons” 
problem.  Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr., Equity Issues and Offering Dilution, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 
61, 74 (1986); Robyn McLaughlin et al., The Information Content of Corporate Offerings of Seasoned 
Securities: An Empirical Analysis, FIN. MGMT., Summer 1998 at 32-33; see generally George A. 
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 
488 (1970). Contra E. Han Kim & Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Corporate Governance and Seasoned 
Equity Offerings 5 (Feb. 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1339642) (finding no empirical support for adverse selection hypothesis). 
57 Note that the assumption that investors reallocate capital in response to extraction of excessive 
executive pay is not inconsistent with the argument that capital markets do not tightly constrain that 
pay.  First, as the models suggest, in the new equilibrium that is established following reallocation, 
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3. Infection of Other Executive Labor Markets 
  
 There is a possible externality associated with excessive public company executive 
pay.  The market failure in the pay setting process at public companies may spill over 
to private companies and possibly even non-profit organizations.  In recent work 
examining executive compensation at portfolio companies held by private equity 
investors, Robert Jackson found no statistically significant difference between private 
and public company executive pay after controlling for firm size and the riskiness of 
pay packages.58  Pay negotiations in the private equity setting should reflect arm’s 
length bargaining,59 but Jackson’s finding of roughly equivalent pay levels in the two 
sectors does not rebut the notion that public company executive pay is excessive.  It 
seems likely that private equity portfolio companies compete with public companies 
for executive talent and that the pool is dominated by the large public companies.60  If 
so, private equity portfolio companies may be price takers and these investors may 
bear part of the cost of the inefficiency of the public company executive pay market. 
 
4. Impact on Growing Inequality of Wealth 
 
 Inequality of wealth in the U.S. has increased markedly in the last several decades.  
Recent data suggests that growth in executive pay may be a significant contributing 
factor.      
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
returns to capital in different sectors or markets are equal.  Second, U.S. executives and company 
directors may have some diffuse interest in the amount of capital invested in the domestic corporate 
sector, but presumably this interest is secondary to other concerns – for the executives, the prospect of 
additional compensation; for the outside directors, managing outrage. 
58 Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Private Equity and Executive Compensation 22-23 (2009) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
59 Private equity funds are pooled investment vehicles that combine the business selection and 
management expertise of fund managers such as Blackstone, Carlyle, and KKR with passive 
investments by pension funds, universities, other institutions, and a few high wealth individuals.  Steven 
N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2009, at 
123. They acquire “portfolio companies” through engaging in leveraged buyouts of existing public 
companies or divisions of public companies or through the purchase of portfolio companies held by 
other private equity funds.  Id. at 124-28.  Private equity funds and the boards they create are active 
monitors and managers of these portfolio companies.  Id. at 131-32.  As a result, the fund managers 
should not be disabled by the agency problems that plague public company executive pay processes. 
60 David I. Walker, Executive Pay Lessons from Private Equity, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1209, 1218 (2011). In 
addition, the public company and portfolio company pay numbers may not be perfectly comparable.  
Jackson finds that portfolio company CEO pay often includes a “deal bounty” paid to an incumbent 
CEO to induce his cooperation in facilitating the private equity buyout.  Jackson, supra note X, at 48.  
Absent deal bounties, average portfolio company CEO pay might be lower than public company pay by 
a statistically significant amount.  Walker, supra, at 1217.  
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 The share of total U.S. pre-tax income (excluding capital gains) earned by the top 
0.1 percent of earners increased from 2% in 1981 to 8% in 2008.61  During the early 
1980s, pre-tax income inequality was only modestly greater in the U.S. than it was in 
Europe.62  Today that difference is dramatic.63  In terms of income inequality, the U.S. 
now looks more like a developing country, with income inequality similar to that of 
Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, and Jamaica.64  Although income inequality is to some 
extent a desirable result of a thriving, capitalist economy, at some level inequality 
becomes a serious policy concern. 
 
 Recent data provided by Jon Bakija, Adam Cole, and Bradley Heim suggest that 
increases in executive pay have contributed substantially to the growth in income 
inequality.  Analyzing individual income tax data, these authors found that executives, 
managers, supervisors, and financial professionals accounted for about 60% of the top 
0.1% of income earners in the U.S. in 2005.65  Non-financial sector, i.e., “main street,” 
executives alone accounted for about 30% of the top 0.1%.66  These authors also found 
that the larger group of executives, managers, supervisors, and financial professionals 
accounted for about 70% of the increase in the share of national income going to the 
top 0.1% of the income distribution between 1979 and 2005.67 
 
 Excessive executive pay may contribute to income inequality from two directions.  
First, as demonstrated in the following figure, the growth in U.S. income inequality 
tracks the growth in public company executive pay.  Of course, the growth in 
executive pay over this period does not necessarily result from market failure.  This 
point is contested,68 but for the purposes of this Article, I am assuming that at least a 
                                                 
 
61 Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, 118 Q. J. 
ECON. 1 (2003). A longer updated version was published in TOP INCOMES OVER THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY: A CONTRAST BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES (A.B. Atkinson & 
Thomas Piketty eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2007) . 
62 Jon Bakija et al., Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners and Causes of Changing Income 




64CIA – The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html?countryName=Nicaragua&countryCode=nu&regionCode=ca&rank
=47 (last visited Aug 16, 2011). 
65 Bakija et al, supra note X, at 3, 51 tbl.3.  In 2005, the income threshold for the top 0.1% of income 
earners (excluding capital gains), was $1.25 million (in 2007 dollars).  Id. at 15-16. 
66 Id. at 51 tbl.3.  In an earlier study, Steven Kaplan and Joshua Rauh argued that public company 
executives accounted for too small a fraction of high income earners to explain much of the increase in 
income inequality.  Steven N. Kaplan & Joshua Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to 
the Rise in the Highest Incomes?, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1004 (2010).  However, Kaplan and Rauh were 
only able to identify the occupations of 17.4% of the top 0.1% of income earners.  Bakija, Cole and 
Heim identify 99% of these individuals.  Bakija et al, supra note X, at 1. 
67 Bakija et al, supra note X, at 3. 
68 Gabaix and Landier have proposed a model involving competitive matching of CEO talent and firms.  
The model predicts that average compensation should move with firm size, and the model explains the 
increase in pay over time, as well as cross-industry and cross-country pay observations.  The authors 
find very little dispersion in CEO talent at the largest firms, but given the tremendous amount of assets 
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part of the growth in executive pay reflects market failure.  Moreover, as suggested in 
subsection II.C.3 above, excessive pay in the public company executive labor may 
infect the private company executive labor market.  Thus, excesses in both markets 
may contribute to the growing share of income captured by executives.69 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
under management and a multiplier effect, the model can explain large pay differentials.  Xavier Gabaix 
& Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 123 Q. J. ECON. 49, 50 (2008). The idea 
that small differences in talent are consistent with large differences in pay was also explored by Charles 
P. Himmelberg & R. Glenn Hubbard, Incentive Pay and the Market for CEOs: An Analysis of Pay-for-
Performance Sensitivity (Mar. 6, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=236089).  
On the other hand, Bebchuk and Grinstein analyzed increases in executive pay between 1993 and 2003 
and concluded that the growth in pay could not be explained by changes in firm size, performance, and 
industry mix. Taking the managerial power approach, they suggested that the bull market of the 1990s 
weakened the outrage constraint, allowing boards to increase executive pay, and that the design of 
equity compensation reduced the salience of this pay, permitting transfers of value that would have been 
inconceivable if paid in cash.  Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note X, at 283. In a similar vein, Murphy 
and Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck argue that the favorable accounting treatment of options in the 1990s 
led boards to systematically undervalue this form of compensation. Kevin J. Murphy, Stock-Based Pay 
in New Economy Firms, 34 J. ACCT. & ECON. 129, 143-45 (2003); Michael C. Jensen et al, 
Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix 
Them 39 (Harvard Negotiations, Org., and Mkt Unit Research Paper Series No. 04-28, 2004), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305 
69 In the figure that follows, income share data was retrieved from The World Top Incomes Database, 
maintained by Facundo Alvaredo, Tony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, available here: 
http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/.  From 1993 forward, CEO pay data is from 
S&P’s Execucomp database, and reflects median pay of S&P 500 firms, excluding financials and 
utilities.  Data from prior years is taken from Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid 
Like Bureaucrats, 113 Q. J. ECON. 653 (1998) (1981-1991 data based on a sample of Forbes 500 
companies) and Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. 
ACCT. & FIN. 3 (2002) (1992 data for S&P 500 industrial companies).  All pay data is inflated to 2008 
dollars based on the CPI index. 
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 Second, to the extent that excessive executive pay results in capital shifting abroad, 
reduced productivity of domestic labor, and reduced wage rates at the low end of the 
income scale, excessive pay would contribute to the growing inequality of wealth in 
the U.S. by reducing the denominator of the equation.  In other words, excessive 
executive pay would result not only in the rich getting richer, but in the poor getting 
poorer, in both a relative and an absolute sense.   
  
5. Distortion in Executive Labor Markets 
 
 Before moving on to consider a possible remedy for the excessive executive pay 
problem, I will briefly mention one other distortion that may result from the market 
failure.  If executive pay is systematically higher than it would be in an efficient labor 
market, we should expect that the number of candidates for senior executive roles 
would be greater, as well.70  MBAs or other individuals choosing between pursuing a 
career as an investment banker, lawyer, or corporate executive would tend to be 
attracted by the rents available to those who succeed in the competition to become 
senior executives.71 
                                                 
 
70 Emmanuel Saez, Direct or Indirect Tax Instruments for Redistribution: Short-Run Versus Long-Run, 
88 J. PUB. ECON. 503, 505 (2004); Cf. Carried Interest, Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Finance, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Joseph Bankman, Professor of Law and Business, Stanford 
Law School) (arguing that the carried interest subsidy distorts career choice) 
71 For evidence that MBA career choices vary based on market factors, see Paul Oyer, The Making of an 
Investment Banker: Stock Market Shocks, Career Choice, and Lifetime Income, 63 J. FIN. 2601 (2008) 
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III. A TAX RESPONSE TO THE EXECUTIVE PAY PROBLEM: A SURTAX 
 
 
 The primary aim of this Article is to describe and evaluate a tax response to the 
problem of excessive executive compensation.  The idea is to combine a surtax applied 
to executive pay above a certain threshold with investor tax relief.  The proposal 
responds to each of the negative consequences of excessive executive pay that were 
discussed in the previous Part.  A surtax placed on excessive pay would reduce the 
after-tax income of executives, which responds to the unfairness of executives 
receiving excessive compensation, to the effect of excess executive pay on income 
inequality, and to the distortion in the executive labor market created by the existence 
of these rents.  Using the proceeds of the surtax to provide investor tax relief would 
mitigate the inefficient distortion in investment incentives created by the extraction of 
excess compensation.   
 
 The two elements of this proposal – the surtax and investor tax relief – need not 
necessarily be linked.  One could support one and not the other.72  Accordingly, this 
Part makes the case for the surtax, and the argument for providing investor tax relief is 
deferred until Part IV.  However, that Part will argue that there are strong economic 
and political reasons to link these two elements in this context.   
 
 This Part begins by briefly outlining how an executive pay surtax might be 
designed and by describing why a surtax would help alleviate several of the problems 
associated with excessive executive pay.  The bulk of this Part addresses the effect of a 
surtax in much greater detail, focusing on potential labor supply distortions, shifting of 
tax incidence, and avoidance.  It concludes that there is reason to be concerned that a 
surtax might be partially “grossed up” by employers, but that otherwise a surtax would 
be a relatively efficient, non-distortionary tax. 
 
A. An Overview of an Executive Pay Surtax and its Benefits 
  
 As envisioned in this Article, a surtax would be applied to compensation received 
by an executive within the taxable year in excess of a threshold.  The surtax would 
piggyback on the existing tax treatment of executive pay.  Thus, all elements of 
executive pay that are currently subject to federal income tax would be subject to the 
surtax, and the amounts subject to the tax would be exactly the same.  The surtax 
would reach salary, annual bonus, long-term incentive plan payouts, the vesting of 
restricted stock, the exercise of non-qualified stock options, and the receipt of various 
taxable perks, such as personal use of corporate jets.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
(demonstrating a relationship between MBA placement in the investment banking sector and the 2-year 
return on the S&P 500 as of graduation).   
72 See infra note x [cross reference footnote citing Mirrlees]. 
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 The surtax could be set at a fixed percentage of all compensation in excess of a 
threshold, e.g., a 10% surtax on all compensation received during the year in excess of 
$1 million, or the surtax could be graduated to apply higher surtax rates to greater 
compensation levels.73  The surtax could be based on a single threshold that would be 
applicable to the executives of all U.S. public companies, or the threshold could be 
customized based on factors such as firm size.  The surtax could be limited to 
executives of public companies, but, as discussed below, there are arguments in favor 
of applying the surtax (perhaps at a lower rate) to executives of large private 
companies and even to executives of non-profit organizations.74 
 
 The idea behind imposing a surtax on executive pay is to extract a portion of 
“unearned” compensation.  A surtax would be expected to produce revenue that could 
be redirected, but it would not be intended to change the level or composition of pre-
tax executive pay.  If the imposition of a surtax did result in downward pressure on 
executive pay, all the better; although, for reasons explained below, I would not 
anticipate that result.  This section discusses the benefits of imposing a surtax under 
the assumption that the tax would be borne by the executives and would not distort 
executive behavior or compensation design.  Those assumptions will be considered 
fully in subsection B below. 
 
 If these assumptions hold, the most obvious result of imposing a surtax on 
executive pay would be to reduce the after-tax compensation of executives subject to 
the surtax, offsetting to some degree the excessive pre-tax pay that results from the 
                                                 
 
73 To provide a sense of magnitude, aggregate compensation in excess of $1 million for each of the top 
five executives at over 2000 public companies included in S&P’s Execucomp database for 2008 was 
$20.2 billion.  See supra note x and accompanying text for a description of Execucomp coverage.  The 
data reported in this note are based on the Execucomp variable TDC2.  TDC2 includes the salary, bonus 
payments, long term incentive payouts, perks, gains on stock option exercise, and the grant date value of 
restricted stock.  Each element aligns with taxable compensation except for the latter.  Restricted stock 
is taxed on vesting, not grant.  Nonetheless, TDC2 provides a reasonable approximation of annual 
taxable executive compensation. 
Twenty billion dollars is a conservative estimate of aggregate annual public company executive pay in 
excess of $1 million per executive.  The database only includes information for the top five executives 
at each company.  Some executives below this rank at very large companies receive pay above this 
threshold.  In addition, the database only includes data on former and present S&P 1500 firms.  
Executives at some smaller public companies may receive compensation in excess of $1 million per 
year. 
Naturally, if we include executives of private companies, the aggregate amount of pay in excess of this 
threshold would increase further.  Bakija, Cole, and Heim estimate that in 2005 there were slightly more 
private company executives earning more than $1 million per year than public company executives and 
that in aggregate these private company executives captured a larger share of national income than the 
public company executives.  Bakija et al, supra note X, at 51 tbl.3.  Thus, it seems likely that including 
private company executives would result in a figure for aggregate annual executive pay in excess of $1 
million per executive of at least twice the $20 billion figure estimated for the top five executives of 
Execucomp firms.   
74 See supra note X and accompanying text. The existence of multinational firms might create certain 
administrative challenges.  The baseline assumption of this Article is that an executive pay surtax would 
be limited to citizens and resident aliens who already pay U.S. taxes on their compensation.   
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deficiencies in the executive labor market.  A surtax would respond directly to the 
unfairness of executives extracting “unearned” compensation, and a surtax would 
mitigate the effect of executive labor market failure on income inequality.  It is 
assumed that a surtax would not affect pre-tax executive pay, but that is irrelevant.  
The real concern is equality of after-tax income and wealth, not of pre-tax income per 
se.  Thus, from an income equality standpoint, the imposition of a surtax would be 
equivalent to a reduction in pre-tax pay. 
 
 An additional benefit of reducing after-tax executive pay would be to mitigate the 
distortion in career choices that likely results from excessive executive compensation.  
The assumption at this point is that a surtax would not affect the behavior of existing 
executives, but that does not mean that it would not affect the behavior of MBA 
recipients and other individuals who would consider corporate management among a 
number of potential careers.  In all likelihood, a surtax would affect career decisions.  
Over the long term, it seems reasonable to assume that individuals consider relative 
after-tax rewards in making career choices.75   
 
 Another advantage of a surtax (versus, say, a cap on executive pay) is that a surtax 
would produce a fund that could be used to provide investor tax relief or simply to 
reduce other distortionary taxes, such as the labor income tax.76  Use of those funds is 
discussed in Part IV. 
 
 A surtax applied to executive pay would not be unprecedented.  Currently, I.R.C. 
§ 4999 imposes a 20% surtax on “golden parachute” severance payments received by 
executives that exceed a certain amount.77  Of course, an alternative way of providing 
incentives through the tax code is to limit deductibility at the corporate level.  I.R.C. 
§ 162(m) limits the deduction for senior executive pay that is not performance based to 
$1 million per executive per year, and § 280G disallows deductions for golden 
parachute payments that are subject to the § 4999 excise tax.78  Commentators 
                                                 
 
75 See supra note x [footnote citing Saez, Bankman & Fleischer].  
Although the main thrust of the surtax is more redistributive than Pigovian, to the extent that the surtax 
helps to correct a flaw in the long-term executive labor market it is Pigovian.  A Pigovian tax is 
intended to mitigate harmful externalities by causing actors to internalize these social costs.  See 
ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920). 
76 N. Gregory Mankiw, One Answer to Global Warming: A New Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, at 
BU6 (arguing that revenue generation is one advantage of imposing a carbon tax over increasing fuel 
efficiency standards).  Fullerton and Metcalf explain that revenue generation is not necessarily a benefit 
to the imposition of regulatory taxes.  But if regulation creates scarcity rents it is better that the 
government capture these rents than that they be left with the regulated parties.  Don Fullerton & Gilbert 
E. Metcalf, Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect 
Something for Nothing?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221, 232 (1998). 
77 I.R.C. § 4999(a) (2006). 
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generally agree that these tax incentives have not been successful,79 and several have 
argued for their repeal.80  However, stand alone repeal of these provisions is politically 
unthinkable, as repeal would appear to loosen the reins on executive pay.  On the other 
hand, combining repeal of these provisions with the adoption of the surtax envisioned 
in this Article could be honestly and convincingly portrayed as regulatory reform 
rather than regulatory relaxation.  The repeal of §§ 162(m), 4999, and 280G would be 
an attractive side benefit if it could be accomplished in conjunction with the 
imposition of a surtax.81   
  
B. The Impact of a Surtax on Executive and Corporate Behavior   
 
 This section considers the likely effect of a surtax on executive and corporate 
behavior.  To reiterate the point made above, the idea behind an executive pay surtax 
is redistribution, not behavioral distortion.82  If the surtax placed downward pressure 
on executive pay, that would be a bonus.  In my view, a surtax would be deemed 
successful if it resulted in the extraction of a portion of the rents received by 
executives without materially affecting short- or medium-term corporate or executive 
behavior. 
 
 The behavioral effects of a surtax can be divided into three categories that will be 
addressed in turn – labor supply effects, shifting of tax incidence, and avoidance.  This 
section concludes that distortions created by a surtax are likely to be small, quite small 
relative to the distortions created by coercive regulation of executive pay, an 
alternative considered in Part V.  Putting this in terms of public finance theory, 
                                                 
 
79 Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, in 14 TAX POL’Y AND 
THE ECON. 1, 1-2 (James M. Poterba ed., Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research 2000); Gregg D. Polsky, 
Controlling Executive Compensation through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 881 (2007). 
80 [Wolk, others] 
81 I thank Andrew Lund and Gregg Polsky for this suggestion.  Each of the existing tax rules likely 
results in a burden on shareholders in the first instance and potentially on other suppliers of capital 
and/or labor if investors readjust their portfolios in response to these taxes.  See Joy Sabino Mullane, 
Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 485 (2009). 
82 It may be useful to compare the aim and effect of I.R.C § 162(m), which, unlike the surtax considered 
here, was intended to shape behavior.  As noted above § 162(m) limits the deductibility of non-
performance based pay received by certain senior executives, and this provision was a response to a 
perceived market failure that resulted in excessive “safe” compensation.  Congress was concerned that 
executives, who at the time received their compensation mainly in the form of salary and guaranteed 
bonuses, were acting too conservatively and that their interests were insufficiently aligned with those of 
shareholders.  Section 162(m) was not designed to produce revenue.  It was intended to redirect 
compensation into stock options and other performance based pay, and it had the intended effect.  In 
hindsight, of course, § 162(m) looks like a mistake.  The tax rule may have contributed to the boom in 
stock options that 1) made executives extremely wealthy when the stock market took off in the 1990s, 
and 2) may have encouraged excessive risk taking in the financial sector that contributed to the 2007-
2008 crisis.  Hall & Liebman, supra note X [Bureaucrats], at 36 (finding that salary reductions post-
1993 were more than offset by additional stock option grants); Polsky, supra note X, at 917-20 
(documenting the widespread belief among informed observers that § 162(m) contributed to the options 
explosion, but also noting the lack of clear cut empirical evidence). 
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minimal expected distortion suggests that a surtax on executive pay might be a “good” 
tax, bearing low efficiency costs.83  The primary concern arising from this analysis is 
that executive pay might be increased to compensate for the surtax.  This “gross up” 
concern will play a role in thinking about surtax design as well as the optimal use of 
surtax proceeds in Part IV. 
 
1. Executive Labor Supply and Income Elasticity84 
 
 A surtax on executive pay would increase the effective marginal tax rate faced by 
covered executives.  For example, at current tax rates, the imposition of a flat 10% 
surtax would increase the marginal federal rate to 45%, and increase marginal 
combined federal and state rates to 50% or more.  One might be concerned that an 
increase in marginal tax rates of this magnitude might adversely impact executive 
labor supply, but economists have concluded that the labor supply elasticity for 
“prime-age males” is close to zero,85 and this finding appears to hold even for high 
income taxpayers.  For example, Moffitt and Wilhelm studied the response of high 
income males to the tax rate reductions enacted in 1986 and found no evidence that 
hours worked were affected by the rate cut.86 
 
 Adjusting hours worked is just one possible response to changes in tax rates.  
Taxpayers might also respond by shifting the timing or type of income or by engaging 
in greater or lesser tax avoidance activities.  In a seminal 1995 paper, Martin Feldstein 
argued that all responses to tax reflect deadweight losses, and stressed the importance 
of looking beyond labor supply effects.87  Recent studies embrace this view and 
investigate the effect of taxes on the elasticity of taxable income (ETI). 
 
 High income taxpayers exhibit greater ETI than low or moderate income 
taxpayers, probably because high income taxpayers have more flexibility to shift the   
                                                 
 
83 See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 292 (6th ed. 2002) (explaining that the excess burden or 
deadweight loss of a tax is a function of the degree of distortion in behavior resulting from substitution 
away from the taxed factor).  
84 For a general overview of the evidence concerning labor supply and taxable income elasticity of high 
income taxpayers, see LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 80-90 
(2008). 
85 Emmanuel Saez et al., The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A 
Critical Review, J. ECON. LITERATURE (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1, on file with author); Joel 
Slemrod, Methodological Issues in Measuring and Interpreting Taxable Income Elasticities, 51 NAT’L 
TAX J. 773, 774 (1998). These studies focus on male individuals as a proxy for primary wage earners.  I 
would not expect any substantial difference in labor supply or taxable income elasticities between male 
and female executives. 
86 Robert A. Moffitt & Mark Wilhelm, Taxation and the Labor Supply Decisions of the Affluent, in 
DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 193, 221 (Joel B. Slemrod 
ed., 2000). Moffitt and Wilhelm analyzed Survey of Consumer Finances data for male heads of 
households between 25 and 54 years of age in 1983.  The mean AGI for their high MTR (or “rich”) 
subsample was $169,000 in 1983 and $287,115 in 1989, the second panel period.  Id. at 205-206. 
87 Martin Feldstein, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study of the 1986 
Tax Reform Act, 103 J. POL. ECON. 551, 552 (1995).  See also Saez et al., supra note X, at 1 (noting that 
“under some assumptions all responses to taxation are symptomatic of deadweight loss”). 
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timing and composition of their income.88  However, studies of executive 
responsiveness to tax rates have failed to find significant non-transitory ETI. 
 
 Austan Goolsbee examined the responsiveness of corporate executives to the 
increase in marginal tax rates that came into effect in 1993.89  Goolsbee found a 
significant reduction in taxable income, but he found that the reduction was almost 
entirely attributable to acceleration in the exercise of stock options undertaken to gain 
advantage of the lower 1992 tax rates.  Once he eliminated stock option compensation 
from his analysis, Goolsbee concluded that corporate executives essentially failed to 
respond to the Clinton era tax hikes.90 
 
 Hall and Liebman replicated Goolsbee’s analysis, extended it back through the 
1980s, and concluded that the timing of option exercise was not explained by changes 
in marginal tax rates, but by stock market movements.91  Essentially, they found that 
executives exercise options following a big run up in stock prices.  Nonetheless, on the 
question of the responsiveness of executives to changes in marginal tax rates, Hall and 
Liebman’s findings were consistent with those of Goolsbee in that their elasticity 
results “fail[ed] to suggest large permanent effects of marginal tax rates on taxable 
income.”92   
 
 Eissa and Giertz generated elasticity results that were similar to Goolsbee’s for the 
Clinton era tax hike.93  However, their analysis of the Bush era tax cuts generated 
negative long-run elasticities,94 and they concluded that their results, and Hall and 
                                                 
 
88 Nada Eissa & Seth Giertz, Trends in High Incomes and Behavioral Responses to Taxation: Evidence 
from Executive Compensation and Statistics of Income Data 2, (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper 
No. 14, 2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7711/2006-14.pdf (citing studies).  
Eissa and Giertz generate ETI figures for high income taxpayers from IRS Statistics of Income data that 
are an order of magnitude greater than the executive ETIs.  Bradley T. Heim, The Effect of Recent Tax 
Changes on Taxable Income: Evidence From a New Panel of Tax Returns, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & 
MGMT. 147, 156 tbl.4 (2009) estimates gross taxable income elasticities in excess of 1.0 for taxpayers 
with incomes in excess of $500,000.  His elasticity estimates for the entire population of taxpayers are 
not significantly affected by adding controls for shifting income from C corporation to S corporation 
form or across time, but he does not specifically address whether shifting may be contributing to the 
elasticities he finds at the high end of the income distribution. 
89 Austan Goolsbee, What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation, 
108 J. POL. ECON. 352 (2000).  The marginal tax rate (federal only) on income in excess of $250,000 
increased from 31% to 39.6% in 1993. 
90 Id. at 352. Excluding options, the elasticity was 0.14.  Id. at 372. 
91 Hall & Liebman, supra note X [Bureaucrats], at 2. 
92 Id. at 41, n.19.  As Goolsbee notes, “permanent” is a misnomer in this context. These analyses capture 
changes in income occurring over a few years.  They do not capture changes in choice of occupation, 
the decision to retire early, or similar very long term effects of taxes.  See Goolsbee, supra note X, at 
366, n.15. 
93 The authors calculated a non-transitory ETI of 0.19 for a large group of executives and a non-
transitory ETI of 0.73 for executives earning in excess of $1 million.  Eissa & Giertz, supra note X, at 
52 tbl.4.1, 59 tbl.4.8.  To put these figures into perspective, net of tax share elasticities in excess of 1.0 
are considered high.  An elasticity greater than (1 – t)/t, where t is the tax rate, would result in an inverse 
relationship between tax increases and revenue collection.  Slemrod, supra note X, at 775. 
94 Eissa & Giertz, supra note X, at 52 tbl.4.1, 59 tbl.4.8. 
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Liebman’s, could not be considered definitive given the variation in elasticities 
between periods and the generation of elasticities with signs that were the opposite of 
those predicted by theory.95  In sum, despite some inconsistent results, the literature 
suggests that the long-run elasticity of the income of corporate executives to tax rate 
changes is modest, much less than the elasticity of high income taxpayers generally.96 
  
 Goolsbee’s analysis suggests that one response of corporate executives to changes 
in tax rates might lie in the timing of the tax realization of equity compensation.  
Although Goolsbee’s findings and interpretation were contested by Hall and Liebman, 
it would not be surprising to observe accelerated exercise of vested, in-the-money 
stock options occurring prior to the imposition of a surtax on executive pay, assuming 
the lead time was adequate to arrange for early exercise.  Such acceleration, however, 
does not seem particularly problematic as long as the surtax that is enacted is 
permanent.97  First, as suggested by Hall and Liebman’s analysis, the impact of 
marginal tax rates on option exercise may be of second order importance behind the 
impact of market movements generally. Second, even if exercise is accelerated at the 
margin, the result is simply the conversion of in-the-money options into stock, which 
may have little effect on executive incentives.98 
 
2. Incidence and Economic Effect of an Executive Compensation Surtax 
 
 A surtax placed on executive pay would be borne by the executives and their firms 
in some combination.  In adopting a surtax, Congress could bar firms from explicitly 
compensating executives for the increased taxes, but could not prevent firms from 
increasing compensation to implicitly “gross up” covered executives.  For several 
reasons, however, it seems unlikely that executives would be fully grossed up with 
respect to an executive pay surtax.  Moreover, if one thought that partial gross ups 
were likely, the surtax rate could be increased to achieve the desired reduction in 
executive after-tax income.   
 
                                                 
 
95 Id. at 2, 4. 
96 Supra notes X. Victor Fleischer suggested to me that the tournament nature of the executive labor 
market may help explain relatively low executive income elasticities.  Over the long run, taxes may 
affect career decisions, but once an executive has entered into and succeeded in the tournament to 
become a senior executive, her labor supply is unlikely to be affected by changes in marginal tax rates.  
See Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, 89 J. 
POL. ECON. 841 (1981) for a presentation of a tournament model of the executive labor market. 
97 Of course no tax rule is actually permanent, but the idea here is of a nominally permanent measure 
rather than a surtax analog of, e.g., a one-time tax holiday for repatriation of profits held outside the 
U.S.  See, e.g., Kristina Peterson, TAX-REPATRIATION HOLIDAY GATHERS SOME STEAM, WALL ST. J. 
ONLINE, June 23, 2011, http://wsj.com (search “Tax-Repatriation Holiday”). 
98 As stock options move into the money, i.e., as it becomes more and more probable that they will be 
exercised at a profit, they begin to look more and more like stock from an incentive perspective.  
RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 577 (9th ed. 2008).  Of course, an 
executive who exercises an option may sell some of the underlying shares to satisfy the tax bill, but to 
the extent that the underlying shares are retained the incentive properties of in-the-money options and 
stock are similar. 
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a. Incidence 
 
 At first blush, one might think that there would be little risk of executives passing 
a surtax on to their firms.  Given the extremely high income and wealth of public 
company executives, particularly of large company CEOs, one might think that pay 
levels serve more as markers of relative success and standing in the executive 
firmament than as limitations on consumption.99  And, of course, relative 
compensation rankings would be unaffected by a surtax placed on executive pay.  By 
this line of reasoning, one would expect executives to fully bear the impact of a surtax. 
 
 However, our experience with I.R.C. §§ 280G and 4999 suggests that the issue is 
more complicated.100  Enacted in 1984, these two provisions disallow corporate level 
tax deductions for and impose an executive level excise tax on excessive severance or 
“golden parachute” payments.  Golden parachute payments are excessive under the tax 
code if they exceed three times an executive’s average compensation over the five year 
period leading up to the executive’s termination due to a change in corporate 
control.101  Congress apparently intended that the restriction on deductibility and 
imposition of a surtax would limit golden parachute payments to three times average 
compensation, and, initially, that was the result.  Over time, however, companies 
began to enter into golden parachute agreements that allowed for payments in excess 
of three times average compensation and promised to gross up executives for the 
excise tax, putting them in the economic position that they would have been in had 
§§ 280G and 4999 never been enacted.102   
 
 In cases in which executives were able to negotiate gross up provisions in their 
golden parachute agreements, the executive level surtax was fully passed on to their 
firms.  The executives who negotiated these gross ups generally faced the prospect of 
an extremely large after-tax payday, even without the gross up.  Thus, the golden 
parachute experience undermines the argument that executives only care about 
nominal compensation.   
 
                                                 
 
99 In a recent paper, Christa Bouwman finds that local geography affects CEO pay, and she presents 
evidence suggesting that envy better explains the geographic effect than does local labor market 
competition or the effect of leading firms in a local market.  See Christa H.S. Bouwman, The Geography 
of Executive Compensation (Aug. 2011) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://faculty.weatherhead.case.edu/bouwman/downloads/BouwmanGeographyOfExecComp.pdf). 
Alternatively, one might think that managers with power would already be extracting as much 
compensation as possible within the outrage constraint prior to the imposition of a surtax and that the 
adoption of a surtax would not enable them to extract any more.  Hence, executives would not be able to 
pass the surtax on to their firms.  This argument is explored further infra. 
100 David I. Walker, Tax Incentives Will Not Close Stock Option Accounting Gap, 96 TAX NOTES 851, 
855 (2002). 
101 The surtax on “excess parachute payments” is 20%.  I.R.C. § 4999(a) (2006).  
102 These golden parachute gross ups occurred despite the fact that the cost to firms often far exceeded 
the benefit to the executives, given the fact that the gross up payments were also subject to the excise 
tax and constituted non-deductible severance payments.  Walker, supra note X [Tax Incentives], at 855. 
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 So why would an executive pay surtax be less likely to be grossed up, or less likely 
to be fully grossed up?  Without a convincing theory of gross ups, it is difficult to be 
definitive, but there are several differences between the golden parachute example and 
a compensation surtax that are suggestive. 
 
 First, it seems likely that a more specific provision, e.g., a surtax directed at one, 
specific element of compensation – severance pay – would be grossed up than a more 
general surtax.  A board could conceivably conclude that a golden parachute equal to, 
say, five times a CEO’s average salary was required in order to create the right 
incentives for her to manage the sale of the company.  The board might conclude that 
with a lesser incentive the CEO might resist a takeover in order to preserve her 
existing stream of compensation.103  As a result, the board might conclude that a gross 
up that preserves the five to one ratio would be worth the cost.104  A surtax that would 
be applied to all elements of executive pay would not create this kind of distortion.   
 
 Second, if one adheres to the managerial power view of the executive pay setting 
process, one would recognize that there are important differences between grossing up 
golden parachute payments and grossing up a general surtax on executive pay.  
Compensation is most salient when it is paid, and golden parachute gross ups would be 
paid only in the event of an executive’s termination in association with a change in 
control.  At that point, the executive, and in all likelihood her board, would be 
departing.  The constraint created by investor and financial press outrage over 
perceived executive pay abuses would have much less force on departing executives 
and overseers.105 
 
  By contrast, a gross up, even an implicit gross up, of a general executive pay 
surtax would show up as additional compensation in publicly available proxy 
                                                 
 
103 Corporate boards and compensation consultants argue that golden parachute agreements play a 
positive role in corporate governance by mitigating the incentives of incumbent managers to resist value 
adding sales of a company in order to preserve their personal economic and non-pecuniary benefits.  See 
Richard P. Bress, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955 (1987). 
104 Similar explanations can be given for other specific tax gross ups.  For example, companies have 
grossed up CEOs for taxes due on personal use of corporate aircraft in cases in which that use was 
mandated by corporate security policies.  David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO 
Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211 (2006).  Although the dollars at 
stake would seemingly be small, a board might conclude that since it is requiring an executive to use 
corporate aircraft, fairness requires that the executive not bear the taxes. 
Note also that the existence of a golden parachute agreement acts as a takeover defense, and the larger 
the after-tax cost of the golden parachute, the stronger the defense.  Thus, executives of potential 
takeover targets might push even harder for gross ups given the multiplier effect of I.R.C. §§ 280G and 
4999. 
105 The very act of entering into an executive employment agreement committing a firm to gross up an 
executive for an excess golden parachute payment might be thought to induce outrage.  However, until 
recently, firms were not required to disclose the terms of gross up agreements in the executive 
compensation discussion and analysis section of their proxy statements.  Employment contracts would 
have been included as exhibits to corporate filings, but gross up agreements buried in appended 
employment agreements would have been much less salient and much less likely to produce outrage 
than the eventual reported payments themselves.   
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statements and in executive pay tables published annually by the New York Times and 
the Wall Street Journal.106  These pre-tax levels of pay are highly salient to investors 
and the financial press, and presumably the outrage constraint works, to the extent it 
works at all, at the level of reported, pre-tax compensation.  It is not obvious why the 
imposition of an executive pay surtax would loosen the outrage constraint.  Thus, it is 
not clear that executives would have the capacity to extract a gross up, if one accepts 
the managerial power view.107   
 
 It is conceivable that outside directors might be willing to endure greater levels of 
outrage associated with grossing up an executive pay surtax if they felt that gross ups 
were in the shareholders’ interest and that shareholder outrage was misdirected.  Some 
outside directors might believe that the executives at their particular firms are not 
overpaid, even if public company executives are overpaid generally.  Such reasoning 
would support a gross up.  Thus, it would be important for Congress to stress the 
systematic nature of the executive pay problem – the idea that, given the practice of 
benchmarking, excess pay at poorly governed firms “infects” pay practices at well 
governed firms.  In other words, directors would need to be convinced that even if 
their pay practices were beyond reproach, their shareholders were the victims of a 
failed market and must not be further disadvantaged by surtax gross ups. 
 
 Presumably, a Congress that adopted a surtax approach would explicitly bar gross 
ups.  Congress might also require that compensation committee members certify in 
their annual proxy materials that the surtax played no role in deliberations over 
executive pay.108  A bar would certainly prevent explicit, contractual, golden 
parachute-type gross ups.  Moreover, an exhortation not to compensate executives for 
the surtax coupled with the requirement of an affirmative certification to that effect 
might increase the effectiveness of the outrage constraint and provide boards with an 
additional moral lever in refusing to gross up executives with respect to the surtax.   
 
                                                 
 
106 To be sure, tax gross ups covering personal use of corporate aircraft and other perks are also 
disclosed in annual proxy statements.  However, these amounts are included in a catchall “other annual 
compensation” category in the summary compensation table and, until recently, the gross up details 
were either buried in footnotes to the statements or not provided at all.  See Regulation S-K, Item 
402(c)(2)(ix)(B), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c)(2)(ix)(B) (2011) (requiring disclosure of tax gross ups in the 
“other compensation” category); Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities 
Act Release No. 8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 54,302A, Investment Company Act Release No. 
27,444A, 2006 WL 2589711 (Sept. 8, 2006) (adopting amendments to the disclosure requirements for 
executive compensation that require separate identification and quantification of tax gross ups).  An 
implicit gross up of an executive pay surtax taking the form of increased salary, bonus, or incentive pay 
would be disclosed in the appropriate pay category and presumably would be more salient. 
107 It is an oversimplification, but if executives have substantial influence over their own pay and if that 
pay is limited by an outrage constraint, one would expect executives to increase their pay up to that 
constraint.  Pay would rise or fall only to the extent that factors internal or external to the company 
served to tighten or loosen the outrage constraint. 




A Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem 
 The story of escalating executive pay over the last several decades is to some 
extent a story of a shift in norms that now permit executives to receive pay that is 
several hundred times that of ordinary workers.  Agency problems have always existed 
in the modern public corporation, but presumably social norms helped limit executive 
pay prior to the 1990s.  Properly crafted, an executive pay surtax might help re-
establish norms of acceptable pay practices.  At the least, careful attention to design 
should mitigate concerns regarding gross ups. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 At the other end of the spectrum from excise taxes on golden parachute payments 
are general personal income tax rate increases.  An executive pay surtax seems to fall 
somewhere in between, so before concluding this subsection it is worth considering 
whether executives are able to shift the incidence of general tax rate increases onto 
their employers.  Eissa and Giertz suggest that one reason that executive income 
elasticities might be lower than those of high income taxpayers generally might be that 
executives are able to pass tax rate hikes on.109  If executives do not bear the burden of 
rate hikes, these executives would not have the same incentives to shift income or 
otherwise avoid the tax.  However, this story, while plausible, would presumably only 
work in one direction.  Managers with power over their own pay would demand to be 
grossed up for tax hikes, but would not be inclined to pass on the benefit of cuts in 
their tax rates.  Thus, the managerial power view suggests that executive elasticities 
would be low with respect to tax increases that are passed on, but would be significant 
with respect to rate cuts, which would be retained by the executives.  There is no 
evidence, however, that the Reagan or Bush era tax cuts resulted in significant, 
positive elasticities for executives,110 and no evidence of which I am aware that 
executives pass on general rate increases to their employers. 
 
 In sum, while we certainly cannot dismiss the possibility that executives would be 
able to shift the incidence of an executive pay surtax onto employers, the surtax seems 
quite different than the executive-level taxes that have been fully grossed up in the 
past.  Moreover, a properly designed surtax should not loosen the outrage constraint on 
executive pay and provide scope for pay increases that would compensate for the 
surtax.  Finally, even in cases in which executive level taxes have been fully grossed 
up, the response was not immediate.  To the extent that firms increased compensation 
to offset all or a portion of an executive pay surtax, the increases would likely be 
gradual, ensuring that current executives would bear a real reduction in after-tax pay. 
 
b. The Economic Impact of Surtax Gross Ups 
 
                                                 
 
109 Eissa & Giertz, supra note X, at 27. 
110 Hall and Liebman included the 1981 and 1986 marginal tax rate reductions in their analysis and 
found non-transitory elasticities that were very small or negative.  Hall & Liebman, supra note X 
[Executive Compensation], at 39-41.  Eissa and Giertz examined the 2001 rate reductions and found 
negative elasticity.  Eissa & Giertz, supra note X, at 3. 
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 Taken in isolation, the imposition of a surtax on excessive executive pay that was 
partially grossed up would have two effects.  Executive after-tax compensation would 
be reduced somewhat, but the existing distortions in corporate investment would be 
exacerbated.  If executives were able to fully shift the incidence of a surtax onto their 
employers, the surtax would not reduce after-tax pay, but would more greatly 
exacerbate investment distortions.  If one thinks that surtax gross ups would be 
complete and immediate, a surtax is simply a bad idea.  However, if one believes that 
gross ups are likely to be partial, at most, and to occur gradually, if at all, one may 
favor the imposition of a surtax, particularly once one realizes that refunding the 
proceeds of a surtax to investors can ensure that distortions in corporate investment 
decisions will not be exacerbated by the imposition of a surtax, even in the case of a 
full gross up.  Moreover, assuming that surtax proceeds are refunded to investors, the 
impact of a partial gross up on executive after-tax income (and investment decisions) 
could be offset by increasing the surtax rate.  Investor tax relief is taken up in earnest 
in Part IV.  It should be apparent from the discussion in this subsection, however, that 
ensuring that the imposition of a surtax would not exacerbate investment distortions 
provides a compelling rationale for linking investor tax relief to the adoption of a 
surtax. 
 
 Imagine a surtax imposed at a 10% rate on executive pay in excess of $1 million 
per year.  Suppose a CEO’s total compensation for the year was expected to be $2 
million, generating a surtax of $100,000.  Absent any gross up, the surtax would 
reduce the executive’s after-tax compensation by $100,000, and $100,000 would be 
available for investor tax relief or other purposes. 
 
 Now imagine that executives are fully grossed up for a surtax.  Assuming a 35% 
marginal rate of tax on ordinary income, a full gross up would require additional pay 
of $182,000.111  This pay increment would cover the $118,000 surtax on the entire 
grossed up amount of $2.182 million and the additional $64,000 tax at ordinary 
income rates on the gross up.  At a 35% marginal corporate rate, the after-tax cost to 
the firm of supplying this gross up would be $118,000.112  Note that this after-tax cost 
is exactly the same as the surtax collected from the executive.  In aggregate, refunding 
the surtax to investors would just keep them whole as long as corporate marginal tax 
rates and executive marginal rates (excluding the surtax) were the same.113  Moreover, 
                                                 
 
111 The formula for determining the gross up amount (GUA) is as follows.   
GUA = (surtax rate * pay in excess of surtax threshold) / (1 – surtax rate – exec MTR on ordinary inc.). 
112 Assuming repeal of I.R.C. § 162(m), there would be no question as to the full deductibility of the 
gross-up of the surtax.  If I.R.C. § 162(m) were to be retained, the gross-up would need to be provided 
in the form of performance-based pay to ensure deductibility.  But doing so would not be difficult.  A 
firm could simply increase the number of shares underlying an option grant to provide a fully deductible 
gross up under I.R.C. § 162(m). 
113 To be more exact, refunding the surtax to investors keeps them whole with respect to a full gross up 
as long as the firm’s corporate marginal tax rate equals or exceeds the executive’s marginal tax rate 
(excluding the surtax). 
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it is readily apparent that in the case of full gross ups, increasing the surtax rate would 
do nothing more than increase the circular flow of funds.114 
 
 Now suppose that executives are able to shift 50% of a surtax onto their 
employers.  Under the facts above, the gross up would be reduced from $182,000 to 
$91,000.  The overall effect in this scenario would be to reduce the executive’s after-
tax compensation by $50,000 (relative to the no surtax, no gross up scenario) and, 
assuming that all surtax proceeds are refunded to investors, increase net investor 
returns by $50,000.115   
 
 Finally, assume 50% shifting to employers but imagine that the surtax rate is 
increased to 20%.  The end result would be a $100,000 reduction in executive after-tax 
compensation and, assuming full refunding, a net $100,000 benefit to investors, which, 
in aggregate, matches the economics of a 10% surtax with no gross up.116  To be clear, 
in the case of partial gross ups, the desired reduction in after-tax executive pay can 
generally be achieved by increasing the surtax rate, and refunding surtax proceeds to 
investors ensures that distortions in investment decisions resulting from extraction of 
excessive pay will be mitigated, not worsened.  The two cases, are not identical, 
however.  Nominal compensation in the 10% surtax, no gross up scenario remains at 
$2 million.  Nominal compensation in the 20% surtax, 50% gross up scenario 
increases to $2.22 million.  The implications of this difference for the design of 
investor tax relief are taken up in Part IV. 
 
3. The Creation of an Executive Pay Target or Focal Point 
 
 Experience with § 162(m) suggests that the creation of an executive pay threshold 
for the purpose of imposing a surtax or a prohibition would have the unintended 
consequence of serving as an invitation to firms paying less than the threshold to 
increase pay levels.  This is a drawback, but a fairly minor one.  As we will see in Part 
V, the pernicious effect of unintentionally setting a pay target would be much greater 
in the case of coercive regulation because, in order to limit the inefficiency associated 
with one-size-fits-all compulsory regulation, caps on pay would almost certainly be set 
at a much higher level than thresholds for applying a surtax. 
                                                 
 
114 Suppose, for example, that the surtax was increased to 20% of pay in excess of $1 million per year 
and that the executive is fully grossed up so as to receive after gross up salary of $2 million.  The gross 
up amount would be $444,444.  The surtax collected would be $288,889.  Incremental ordinary income 
tax collected would be $155,555.  The employer’s after-tax cost of funding the gross up would be 
$288,889. 
115 In other words, the surtax collected and made available for investor tax relief ($109,000) would 
exceed the after tax cost of providing the gross up ($59,000, at a 35% marginal rate) by $50,000. 
116 Under the same assumptions as before, increasing the surtax rate to 20% implies a full gross up 
amount of $444,444 and a 50% gross up amount of $222,222.  With pre-tax compensation of 
$2,222,222 the executive would face a compensation surtax of $244,444 (20% of $1,222,222) and 
additional tax at ordinary income rates of $77,777 (35% of $222k) yielding total incremental taxes of 
$322,222.  Given the $222,222 pre-tax gross up amount, the executive would be down $100,000 after 
tax.  The firm’s after-tax cost of supplying the gross up would be $144,444 (65% of $222,222), which is 
$100,000 less than the surtax collected from the executive. 
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 As noted above, § 162(m) limits corporate tax deductions for non-performance 
based senior executive pay to $1 million per executive per year.  Section 162(m) was 
not designed to produce revenue.  It was intended to redirect compensation into stock 
options and other forms of performance based pay, which remain fully deductible.  In 
1992 when § 162(m) was enacted, $1 million per year was at the high end of the CEO 
salary range.  Section 162(m) did have the desired effect of shifting pay into 
performance based channels, but it also acted as a focal point or target, as much as it 
did as a cap, on non-performance based pay.  Following the enactment of § 162(m), 
CEOs who received salaries below $1 million per year tended to receive larger pay 
increases, and CEOs whose pay was furthest below $1 million per year tended to 
receive the largest pay increases.117  It appears that companies read § 162(m) as 
endorsement of CEO salaries up to $1 million per year. 
 
 I will argue in Part V that the focal point problem is less pernicious in the case of a 
surtax than a pay cap.  Nonetheless, the focal point concern would provide an 
argument for adopting a relatively low initial threshold for applying a surtax and 
gradually increasing the rate at higher levels of income.   
 
4. Avoidance and Other Responses 
 
 Subsection 2, above, considered who, between firms and executives, would bear 
the burden of a surtax on executive pay.  However that tension is resolved, firms and 
executives working together would have an incentive to avoid the surtax altogether if 
they could.  This section considers possible avoidance strategies ranging from changes 
in compensation design or increased use of deferred compensation to shifts in 
organizational form.  This section also briefly considers the potential impact of a 
surtax on after-tax incentives and on ex ante employment decisions. 
 
a. Compensation Design from a “Global” Contracting 
Perspective 
 
 Myron Scholes and Mark Wolfson popularized a way of thinking about tax 
planning for executive pay that they called a global contracting approach.118  Their 
quite sensible idea was that employers and executives should select compensation 
instruments that minimize the combined tax burden and share the tax savings.  
However, they also recognized that compensation decisions entail non-tax costs and 
benefits, such as the creation of desirable incentives, that must be taken into account in 
compensation planning.   
 
 This subsection applies this global tax perspective in considering whether the 
impact of a surtax could be avoided in full or in part by issuing incentive stock options 
                                                 
 
117 See David G. Harris & Jane R. Livingstone, Federal Tax Legislation as an Implicit Contracting Cost 
Benchmark: The Definition of Excessive Executive Compensation, 77 ACCT. REV. 997 (2002). 
118 MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH (3d ed. 2005).  
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(ISOs) in lieu of nonqualified stock options (NQSOs), by increasing the use of equity 
compensation or deferred compensation generally, or by channeling compensation into 
non-taxed perks.  The short answers are no, no, and perhaps yes, but only to a limited 
extent.119   
    
i. ISOs versus NQSOs 
 
 From a global contracting perspective, the most obvious compensation adjustment 
to consider in response to the imposition of a surtax on ordinary compensation income 
would be a switch from non-qualified stock options to incentive stock options.120  
ISOs become increasingly tax advantaged as the rate of tax on executive ordinary 
income increases, and the incentive properties of the two types of options are 
essentially identical.  Under current tax laws, however, the scope to shift from NQSOs 
to ISOs would be very limited.  If limits on the size of ISO awards were raised, 
avoidance could be curtailed by applying the compensation surtax to ISO gains at 
exercise.   
 
 To unpack this, we must begin with a brief summary of the tax treatment of ISOs 
and NQSOs.  The difference between the market price of the underlying stock and an 
NQSO’s exercise price is included in the ordinary income of the optionee at exercise, 
and the employer that granted the option is entitled to a deduction in the same amount 
and in the same period for compensation paid.  Going forward, the employee holds the 
underlying stock as a capital asset with basis equal to the market value of the stock at 
exercise. 
 
 If holding period and other requirements are satisfied, ISOs are not taxed until the 
underlying stock is sold, and the optionee is taxed at capital gains rates on the entire 
gain on the option.121  For the optionee, ISO treatment converts ordinary income into 
capital gain and permits deferral of tax beyond the point of exercise.122  However, the 
issuing firm pays a price in that no compensation deduction is allowed with respect to 
options taxed as ISOs.  As these descriptions suggest, the relative tax advantage of 
ISOs versus NQSOs depends on the rate of tax on employee ordinary income, 
employee capital gains, and corporate income.  All else being equal, ISOs become 
                                                 
 
119 Readers who have a limited appetite for detailed analyses of the tax treatment of equity pay may 
wish to take my word with respect to the first two propositions and skip ahead to subsection (4)(a)(iii), 
which considers increased use of non-taxed perks. 
120 I use the term “ordinary compensation income” to reflect the idea that a surtax would apply to an 
executive’s compensation income reported on Form W-2 that is today taxed as ordinary income.  The 
surtax would not apply to other sources of ordinary income such as interest income.  In addition, the 
surtax would not apply to all income from services, such as gains on founders’ stock (see Victor 
Fleischer, Taxing Founders’ Stock, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2011)) or (at least as a first pass) gains 
on ISOs taxed as capital gain. 
121 I.R.C §§ 421(a), 422(a) (2006).  In order to qualify for ISO tax treatment, shares underlying ISO 
must be held for at least two years following the grant of the option and at least one year following 
option exercise. 
122 Deferral is only advantageous in this situation if option expiration is approaching and the employee 
has a non-tax reason for holding the underlying shares beyond exercise. 
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more attractive as the rate of tax applied to employee ordinary compensation income 
increases.   
 
 At current top marginal tax rates for executives and corporations, non-qualified 
options are preferred over ISOs from a global contracting perspective.123  However, if 
a 10% surtax were to be applied to executive compensation income, including gains 
from the exercise of non-qualified options, high marginal rate firms and executives 
would be roughly indifferent between the two types of options.124  At a 15% surtax, 
ISOs would clearly be tax preferred.125   
 
 Given the ability to carryover losses from previous years,126 many corporations 
face effective tax rates that are less than the 35% nominal effective rate, and another 
way to look at the ISO/NQSO tradeoff is in terms of the breakeven corporate tax rate.  
At current top marginal individual rates, non-qualified options remain tax preferred 
until the effective corporate rate falls below 24%.127  With a 10% surtax, ISOs would 
be taxed preferred at any firm facing an effective marginal rate of 35% or less.128  In 
sum, the imposition of a surtax on executive compensation income would make ISOs 
relatively more attractive and, in fact, tax preferred at many firms.  Put another way, to 
the extent that executives and firms could shift from the use of non-qualified options 
to ISOs, they would be able to partially avoid the impact of the surtax in many 
situations. 
 
 Of course, if one thought there was a significant risk that the economic impact of a 
compensation surtax could be avoided by shifting pay into ISOs, one solution would 
be to apply the surtax to all options – ISO or NQSO – at the time of exercise.  Doing 
so would not be administratively burdensome as the paper gains on ISOs at exercise 
are already treated as an adjustment in computing the Alternative Minimum Tax.129 
                                                 
 
123 SCHOLES ET AL., supra note X, at 230.  Non-qualified options are preferred from a global tax 
perspective when the corporate tax rate is greater than the ratio of the tax rate on the optionee’s ordinary 
compensation income minus the effective tax rate on the optionee’s capital gains over one minus the 
effective capital gains rate.  The effective capital gains rate reflects the deferral beyond exercise of 
taxation on ISO gains.  In the calculations that follow, I have assumed a nominal executive capital gains 
rate of 15% and deferral for one year at an after-tax rate of 5%, yielding an effective capital gains rate of 
14.3%.  At a 35% marginal rate on ordinary compensation income, the breakeven corporate tax rate is 
24%.  Thus, NQSOs are jointly preferred for firms facing effective marginal rates equal to the 35% top 
stated rate. 
124 Increasing the marginal rate on ordinary compensation income from 35% to 45% increases the 
breakeven corporate marginal rate to 36%, slightly higher than the stated rate.  If one assumes that ISOs 
provide no deferral benefit, such that the effective capital gains rate is equal to the nominal rate, the 
breakeven corporate rate in this scenario is 35%. 
125 At a 50% marginal rate on ordinary compensation income, the breakeven corporate marginal rate is 
42%. 
126 See I.R.C § 172 (2006) (permitting losses to be carried back two years and forward twenty years). 
127 See supra note x. 
128 See supra note x. 
129 Applying the surtax to ISO gains at exercise might be thought to be particularly unfair or 
burdensome in that executives are required to retain shares underlying ISOs for at least one year 
following exercise in order to qualify for preferential tax rates, I.R.C. § 422(a) (2006), but observers 
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 It is not clear, however, that we would need to apply the surtax to ISO exercise 
because the capacity of firms to issue ISOs to senior executives is extremely limited.  
The ISO provision of the Code includes a non-inflation adjusted annual limit on ISO 
grants of $100,000 per recipient.130  The limit applies to the aggregate fair market 
value of stock subject to ISOs that first becomes exercisable in a given year, and the 
dollar limit is based on the market value of the stock subject to the option on the date 
of grant.  Purported ISO shares in excess of this limit are treated as NQSO shares.     
  
 Compensatory options are almost always granted at the money, that is, with an 
exercise price equal to the fair market value of the underlying stock on the date of 
grant.131  Under a reasonable range of assumptions, the per share value of an at-the-
money option on the stock of a large public company would be somewhere between 
30% and 50% of the share price.132  As a result, the value of an option on shares worth 
$100,000 would be around $30,000 to $50,000.  For a senior corporate executive 
subject to a surtax on pay, the difference between ISO and NQSO tax treatment on a 
chunk of compensation this small would be negligible.   
 
 If an executive pay surtax were to be adopted, executives and firms might lobby 
for an increase in the limitation on ISOs.  In such a case, it might make sense to 
reconsider applying the surtax to ISOs at exercise.  Absent an increase in the ISO 
limitation, the scope for avoidance via ISO issuance seems trivial. 
 
ii. Other Equity Based Pay and Deferred Compensation 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
may not be seriously concerned about cash flow issues faced by the population of executives who would 
be subjected to the surtax. 
More generally, the application of the AMT to ISO gains at exercise has long been problematic.  In 
cases in which ISO exercise produces a paper gain at exercise, but in which share prices drop before the 
ISO holding period requirements are satisfied, it often turns out that the former holder has little or no 
net gain on the ISO, but paid substantial AMT at exercise.  Former ISO holders were entitled to a credit 
for AMT paid on ISO exercise, but that credit could well exceed the tax due on the sale of the 
underlying shares, creating what is known as the “ISO AMT Trap.”  Young, relatively low paid tech 
workers who received a substantial chunk of their compensation in ISOs and fell into the AMT trap 
provided a fairly compelling case for relief, and Congress provided that relief in 2006. Tax Relief and 
Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432 § 402, 120 Stat. 2922, 2953 (2006) (codified at I.R.C. § 
53(e) (2006)) (allowing a refundable tax credit through 2012). However, the same degree of sympathy 
may not extend to highly compensated executives who would be subject to a surtax. 
130 I.R.C. § 422(d) (2006). 
131 Today, at-the-money option design is ubiquitous because I.R.C. § 409A effectively bars grants of in-
the-money options and employees excessively discount out-of-the-money options. David I. Walker, The 
Non-Option: Understanding the Dearth of Discounted Employee Stock Options, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1505, 
1508, 1549-50 (2009). 
132 The value of an at-the-money option is primarily a function of the time to exercise and the volatility 
of the stock.  The figures provided in the text are based on a six year period to option exercise, stock 
price volatility ranging from 25% to 50%, no dividends, and a 3% risk free rate. 
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 A surtax on executive pay would have little or no impact on the attractiveness from 
a global contracting perspective of non-qualified deferred compensation or of equity 
based compensation relative to non-equity pay.  Thus, equity pay and deferred 
compensation would not present a significant avoidance opportunity. 
 
 Of course, one would have to take some care in designing a surtax to guard against 
avoidance through the use of tax advantaged deferred compensation.  Under current 
tax rules, executives can enter into non-qualified deferred compensation arrangements 
with their employers that defer compensation, earnings on that compensation, and the 
tax on both until the amounts are received at retirement or other termination from 
employment.133  From a global contracting perspective, non-qualified deferred 
compensation tends to be preferable when an executive’s tax rate is likely to be lower 
at payout than when the compensation is earned, when the employer’s tax rate is likely 
to be higher at payout than when the compensation is earned, or when the employer 
can invest at a higher after-tax rate than can the executive.134 
 
 Suppose, for example, that a surtax was designed to apply to an executive’s W-2 
compensation in a year.  Amounts deferred through a non-qualified plan would not be 
reported in the year earned and would not be subjected to the surtax.  In this case, it 
would be important to ensure that the deferred compensation was subjected to the 
surtax when it was paid out.  Otherwise, executives and firms could avoid the surtax 
through non-qualified deferred compensation. 
 
 One might also think at first blush that increasing an executive’s effective marginal 
tax rate by applying a surtax to compensation would encourage deferral by lowering 
her after-tax investment returns, but a surtax would have no impact on the after-tax 
savings rates available to an executive outside of a company plan.  The surtax would 
apply only to compensation received in the year.  Outside of a company plan, an 
executive would be taxed on her investment gains at the regular ordinary income rates 
or capital gains rates that apply to all individual investors. 
 
 Assuming that employer and executive tax rates are not expected to change over 
time and that non-qualified deferred compensation is attractive at a particular company 
because the employer can obtain higher after-tax investment returns (perhaps because 
losses from prior years result in a low effective marginal rate), placing a surtax on 
executive compensation income would make deferred compensation somewhat less 
attractive.  The reason, in a nutshell, is that the executive-level tax benefit in this 
scenario is equivalent to imposing tax on the amount deferred in the year earned and 
exempting subsequent investment gains from tax.  As the rate of tax on compensation 
                                                 
 
133 Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of Deferred Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 
571, 577 (2007). 
134 SCHOLES ET AL., supra note X, at 214.  Note that employer tax deductions associated with non-
qualified deferred compensation are deferred as well. 
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income increases and the notional after-tax pool of funds diminishes, the benefit of 
exempting returns on that amount falls as well.135   
 
 The imposition of a relatively flat surtax on executive pay would seem to have 
little impact on deferred compensation decisions.  However, if a steeply graduated 
surtax were to be adopted, it might be advisable to apply the surtax to all 
compensation, deferred or non-deferred, earned by an executive within the year.  In 
such a case, an executive might anticipate being subjected to a lower surtax at 
retirement and might increase deferred compensation for that reason.  Note that the 
imposition of a surtax on amounts deferred in the year earned would not prevent an 
executive from enjoying the current benefits of deferral (if any) with respect to 
ordinary tax rates.136  To be sure, the added tax burden might discourage deferral at 
the margin since an executive would have to come up with the funds to pay the surtax, 
but the application of a modest surtax on compensation amounts deferred by very high 
income individuals would not seem too burdensome.137 
 
 As in the case of non-qualified deferred compensation, if tax rates are not expected 
to change over time, the global tax advantage of NQSOs and restricted stock relative 
to salary and bonus, for example, depends primarily on the after-tax investment rates 
available to firms and executives.  A surtax on executive pay would not affect after-tax 
returns to executives on investments made with post-compensation dollars.  Those 
returns would continue to be taxed at ordinary marginal rates or capital gains rates.  
On this dimension, a surtax would be irrelevant. 
 
 As in the case of deferred compensation, however, in cases in which equity 
compensation is tax preferred, the extent of the preference does depend on the rate of 
tax applied to an executive’s compensation income, and, as before, placing a surtax on 
executive compensation income would tend to somewhat reduce the attractiveness of 
equity compensation.138 
 
 Companies, however, also care about the incentive properties of various 
compensation instruments, and the strength of executive incentives depends on after-
                                                 
 
135 See, e.g., Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of Money”, 95 YALE L.J. 
506 (1986). 
136 At current tax rates, a global tax benefit arises primarily when employers are able to invest at a low 
after-tax rate because they have a low effective marginal rate due to accumulated NOLs or invest in 
their own stock on a tax exempt basis per I.R.C. § 1032 (2006).  See Halperin, supra note x [Yale L.J.], 
at 540. 
137 Academic commentators generally conclude that under current tax rules non-qualified deferred 
compensation can provide tax savings to the high income individuals that participate in them and their 
employers.  See, e.g., Halperin, supra note X [Yale L.J.]; Daniel Halperin, 2009 Erwin N. Griswold 
Lecture Before the American College of Tax Counsel: Rethinking the Advantage of Tax Deferral, 62 
TAX LAW. 535 (2009); Yale & Polsky, supra note X.  As such, moves that marginally discourage the 
use of these plans would not seem unwelcome. 
138 This analysis, based on the global contracting approach of Scholes and Wolfson, ignores the impact 
of tax rates on the incentives generated by stock and option compensation.  Incentive effects are added 
to the picture in subsection b below.  
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tax, not pre-tax outcomes.  An increase in personal tax rates, or, in this case, the 
adoption of an executive pay surtax, reduces after-tax incentives created by stock and 
options (or other forms of incentive compensation).  In this respect, one can draw an 
analogy between taxes and insurance.  An increase in marginal rates reduces after tax 
returns on incentive pay when outcomes are positive and cushions the negative effects 
when outcomes are negative.  As marginal rates increase, an employer would have to 
increase pre-tax incentives in order to maintain the desired level of after-tax 
incentives.  Peter Katuscak has theorized that in the case of risk and effort averse 
executives, it would be optimal for firms to offset the effect of an increase in marginal 
employee tax rates to some extent by increasing pre-tax incentives.139  Under 
Katuscak’s model, however, after firms adjust, the net result of the imposition of an 
executive pay surtax would still be a modest reduction in after-tax incentives.140 
 
 Finally, in discussing non-qualified deferred compensation, I suggested that, 
despite the lack of impact on relative after-tax investment rates, we still might want to 
apply the surtax in the year that deferred pay is earned.  The reason is that if a 
graduated surtax were to be adopted, a covered executive might expect to be in a lower 
effective marginal rate (regular ordinary rate plus surtax) at retirement than in the year 
in which pay is earned.  An expectation of decreasing marginal tax rates encourages 
deferral.  Of course, restricted stock and NQSOs also result in deferral of income, but 
the period of deferral generally is quite short.  Restricted stock typically vests and 
becomes taxable between one and five years following grant.141  Options typically are 
exercised within six years of grant.142  Given this relatively short timeframe, it seems 
perfectly reasonable (as well as being administratively convenient) to apply the surtax 
to NQSO gains at exercise and to restricted stock at vesting consistent with the timing 
of the taxation of these instruments as ordinary compensation income.   
 
iii. Non-Taxed Perquisites 
 
 The imposition of a surtax on executive pay would increase the attractiveness of 
non-taxed perquisites relative to conventional taxed compensation.  However, my 
intuition is that the scope to pay executives in perks is fairly limited and that a modest 
surtax would not result in very much avoidance of this type. 
 
                                                 
 
139 Peter Katuscak, The Impact of Personal Income Taxation on Executive Compensation (May 8, 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=649851). 
140 Id. 
141 FREDERICK W. COOK & CO., THE 2009 TOP 250: LONG-TERM INCENTIVE GRANT PRACTICES FOR 
EXECUTIVES 13 (2009), http://www.fwcook.com/alert_letters/2009_Top-250-Report.pdf. 
142 See J. Carr Bettis et al., Exercise Behavior, Valuation, and the Incentive Effects of Employee Stock 
Options, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 446, 447 (2005) (finding for a sample of 140,000 option exercises by 
executives at almost 4000 firms between 1996 and 2002 that, on average, options were exercised a little 
over two years following vesting and more than four years prior to expiration); Jennifer N. Carpenter, 
The Exercise and Valuation of Executive Stock Options, 48 J. FIN. ECON. 127, 138 (1998) (finding for a 
sample of forty firms (mainly large manufacturers) that executive stock options granted between 1983 
and 1984 were, on average, exercised after 5.8 years). 
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 Suppose, for example, that, in response to the imposition of a surtax, a company 
purchases a house for $10 million that it allows its CEO and her family to live in rent 
free.  Suppose the fair market rental value of the property would be $500,000 per year.  
If the rental value of this home is excludable, the surtax (as well an individual income 
taxes generally) could be avoided on $500,000 per year in compensation.143  In order 
for company provided housing to be excludable from income, the housing must be 
provided for the convenience of the employer, must be on the business premises, and 
must be provided and accepted as a condition of employment.144  Each requirement is 
something of a term of art in tax law, and one can find examples of the exclusion 
being upheld in situations that stretch the common sense meanings of business 
premises and convenience of the employer.145   
 
 Combined business and personal travel might provide another example.  Aside 
from the 50% limitation on the deductibility of meals,146 business travel is deductible 
by the employer and results in no tax consequences for the executive.  Following the 
imposition of a surtax, one would think that “business” travel to attractive destinations 
would become somewhat more attractive, representing a shift in compensation to this 
non-taxed perk.  
 
 Nonetheless, I would not anticipate a great deal of compensation being redirected 
in this fashion following the imposition of a surtax.  The shift into employer owned 
housing would seem to be the most significant threat, and even here the ability and 
willingness of firms and executives to redirect compensation would be limited for at 
least four reasons.  First, there is the difficulty of qualifying for the exclusion under the 
tax rules and regulations.147  Second, public companies must now disclose in the 
executive compensation discussion section of their annual proxy statements all 
substantial perks (taxed or untaxed) delivered to their top executives.148  Public 
company executive compensation packages are now subject to a separate shareholder 
vote that is non-binding, but quite embarrassing to lose.  And excessive perks appear 
                                                 
 
143 The employer would be entitled to deduct its expenses related to the acquisition and maintenance of 
this business property.  I.R.C. § 162. 
144 I.R.C. § 119(a) (2006). 
145 See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 585 F.2d 1060 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (holding that housing located in a 
prestigious Tokyo location and provided to the president of a Japanese subsidiary of a U.S. company 
was on the business premises because the house was associated with the company and was used 
regularly for business entertaining). 
146 I.R.C. § 274(n) (2006). 
147 I.R.C. § 119(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(b). 
148 SEC Release No. 33-8732A (2006).  The SEC now requires proxy statement identification and 
valuation of any perk that is valued at the greater of $25,000 or ten percent of total perk value.  The SEC 
has declined to define “perquisite” for disclosure purposes, but has noted that an item need not be 
disclosed if it is “integrally and directly related to the performance of the executive’s duties.”  
Otherwise, any item conferring a personal benefit constitutes a perk for these purposes.  Moreover, the 
SEC has stressed that the fact that an item might be provided for the convenience of the employer and 
non-taxable for the executive is not relevant in determining whether an item must be disclosed.  Finally, 
executive housing is specifically listed in the SEC release as an example of an item that must be 
disclosed as a perk.  Id.   
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to be a huge red flag for proxy advisory firms making recommendations on 
shareholder “say on pay” votes.  Third, aside from a (relatively) modest base salary, 
most executive compensation is incentive pay of one form or another, and redirecting 
that compensation into perks would diminish the incentives the board is attempting to 
create.  Fourth, a modest surtax would not result in excessively high marginal rates, 
and would not increase the driving force to shift compensation into non-taxed perks to 
a very significant extent.149   
 
 In addition, of course, the imposition of a surtax on executive pay would increase 
the attractiveness of other “working condition” fringe benefits,150 such as fancy office 
chairs, but this is trivial.  A surtax would also provide a stronger incentive for firms to 
provide executives with non-taxed health151 or life insurance152 coverage, but the 
statutory exclusion for fringe benefits of this type is extremely limited, and so called 
“split dollar” life insurance arrangements that formerly provided an end-run around the 
statutory limitation on that benefit have been sharply curtailed.153     
 
b. Organizational Form  
 
 At the margin, imposing a surtax on executive pay could impact choices regarding 
organizational form, such as the public/private decision or the decision to organize as a 
subchapter C corporation or as a pass-through entity.  The result is a series of line 
drawing problems.  For example, should the surtax be limited to public company 
executives, or be extended to cover executives of private firms? 
 
 Obviously, limiting a surtax to the compensation received by public company 
executives would increase the incentive for public companies to go private and for 
private companies to shun public offerings.  One might think that a modest surtax 
placed on the compensation received by a handful of senior executives would not 
affect the public/private calculus in any meaningful way, but a surtax limited to public 
                                                 
 
149 Contrast the imposition of a hard cap on executive pay.  If a cap did not apply to corporate owned 
executive housing or to personal travel disguised as business travel, one would expect significant 
increases in these activities following the imposition of a cap.  See infra note X and accompanying text. 
150 I.R.C. § 132(a)(3)&(d) (2006). 
151 I.R.C. § 106 (2006) (exclusion of health or accident insurance provided by employer). 
152 I.R.C. § 79 (2006) (exclusion of $50,000 of group-term life insurance provided by employer). 
153 In a split dollar life insurance arrangement, an employer and an executive joined in the purchase of a 
“whole life” life insurance policy covering the executive.  (A “whole life” policy includes an investment 
element in addition to “term” insurance coverage.)  Typically, the employer paid some or all of the 
premiums and was entitled to recover the premiums paid from policy proceeds. The executive received 
current life insurance coverage and was entitled to policy proceeds in excess of employer contributions. 
The tax issue was how to value the benefits conferred on executives through the employer contributions.  
Prior to 2002, the IRS took the position that an executive was required to pay or recognize as income 
only the “term cost” of the life insurance, which was typically well below the actual value transferred 
from employer to employee.  The additional value transferred was not deductible by the employer, but 
to the extent that the executive’s marginal rate exceeded the firm’s marginal rate, this arrangement was 
attractive from a global contracting perspective.  In 2001 and 2002, the IRS issued notices that 
eliminated the tax advantage of split dollar insurance arrangements.  See Stewart Reifier, New IRS Rules 
for Split-Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements, CORP. BUS. TAX’N MONTHLY, May 2003, at  20, 21-27.   
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company executives would add to a growing list of burdens of being a public 
company, including the increased compliance costs associated with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act,154 and for some firms could represent the proverbial straw that breaks the 
camel’s back.  There are still good reasons for going public, such as providing 
liquidity to employee stockholders,155 but it is becoming more clear over time that 
diversified public shareholders are not necessarily needed as the ultimate enterprise 
risk bearers.156  
 
 The cleanest way to eliminate the incentive to go or stay private would be to 
extend the surtax to include private company executives, and, to the extent that the 
private company executive labor market is “infected” by excesses in the public 
company market, such an extension could well be justified.  But doing so would not 
eliminate the line drawing problem, it would simply shift it. 
 
 Private company executives represent a significant fraction of very high income 
taxpayers.  Bakija, Cole, and Heim estimated that in 2005 there were more private 
company executives earning more than $1 million per year than public company 
executives.157  Bakija, Cole, and Heim did not have information on organizational 
form, but private companies would have consisted primarily of closely held businesses 
organized as C corporations, S corporations, or LLCs.  Some of these businesses 
would have been portfolio companies held by private equity funds; others would have 
been independent stand alone business ventures.   
 
 Given a lack of dispersed ownership, executive pay arrangements at these private 
companies are more likely to be at arm’s length than are public company pay 
arrangements.  In cases in which there is a close identity of ownership and 
management, pay levels are essentially irrelevant.158  At portfolio companies and 
similar firms where managers and owners are not identical, we would expect private 
equity owners or their counterparts to bargain vigorously over executive pay.  As 
                                                 
 
154 See Ellen Engel et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms’ Going Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 116 (2007) (finding an increased frequency of going private transactions in the wake of the 
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley). 
155 Even this benefit of going public is being eroded as markets develop in shares of closely held firms.  
The SEC is currently examining the proper role and the proper regulation of these markets.  See, e.g., 
Peter Lattman, Stock Trading in Private Companies Draws S.E.C. Scrutiny, DEALBOOK, Dec. 27, 2010, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/27/stock-trading-in-private-companies-draws-scrutiny; Julianne 
Pepitone, SEC Casts Wide Net in Private Stock Trading Probe, CNNMONEY, Feb. 28, 2011, 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/27/technology/secondary_market/index.htm; Julianne Pepitone, SEC 
May Ease Private Stock Sale Rules, CNNMONEY, Apr. 8, 2011, 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/08/technology/SEC_shareholder_limit/index.htm. 
156 Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, 
and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231 (2008) 
157 Bakija et al, supra note X, at 51 tbl.3. 
158 At the extreme, consider a situation in which a firm has a sole shareholder who is also the company’s 
CEO.  Taxes aside, whether the owner takes her profits in the form of compensation or dividends is 
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noted above, however, to the extent that private companies compete with public 
companies for executive talent, private company pay negotiators would have to 
recognize and compensate for rent that could be extracted by executives at public 
firms.  In other words, despite the existence of arm’s length bargaining, executives of 
private companies may benefit from the lack of effective bargaining at public 
companies.  If so, this phenomenon would provide a justification for expanding the 
reach of an executive pay surtax to encompass private company executives.159  
 
 But placing a surtax on private company executives would likely create distortions.  
Public companies can go private, but they are unlikely to remain public and become 
pass-through entities.  Some private companies that are currently organized (or as a 
startup potentially would organize) as C corporations and compensate their executives 
with salary, bonus, and equity compensation might respond to a surtax on executive 
pay by adopting a pass-through structure that provides compensation in the form of 
partnership profits.160  Theoretically, a surtax could be designed to reach 
compensation in this form, but then the designer would have to struggle with 
distinguishing labor income from investment income.161  That, perhaps, would be a 
ridge too far. 
 lower rates – perhaps 50% of the 
  
c. Career Decisions  
                                                
b
 
 So there is a tension.  On the one hand, extending the reach of a surtax to include 
private company executive pay would respond to the inflation of pay levels in this 
market that results from excess pay in the public company market and would avoid 
creating a new incentive for public companies to go private.  On the other hand, 
extending the surtax to private companies would encourage those companies to 
restructure so as to avoid the surtax on compensation.  Perhaps a compromise that 
would balance these competing concerns would be in order.  The surtax might be 
extended to cover private firm executive pay, but at
rate that applies to public company executive pay.   
 
 Although economists generally agree that short and medium-term labor supply 
elasticity for high income primary earners is quite low,162 a surtax applied to executive 
 
 
159 At first blush, one might think that applying a surtax to public company executive pay could be 
costly for private companies to the extent that public company executives are able to negotiate higher 
pay levels to compensate for the tax.  But this is not necessarily the case.  If we assume that private 
companies negotiate effectively at arm’s length but are essentially price takers, they would only need to 
keep executive candidates whole on an after-tax basis. 
160 See Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX L. REV. 89, 93-96 (2008) (describing Blackstone’s 
issuance of common units in a publicly traded partnership that enabled Blackstone’s founders to 
continue to receive their returns in the form of carried interest taxed at capital gains rates).  Placing a 
surtax on private company executive pay would also exacerbate the problem identified by Fleischer in 
Taxing Founders’ Stock, supra note X, by encouraging founders to take their labor earnings in the form 
of share price appreciation. 
161 Cf. Fleischer, supra note X [Founders’ Stock]. 
162 See supra notes X(87-99) and accompanying text. 
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pay could affect the career decisions of talented individuals.  Directionally, imposing a 
e positions would be 
flated as well.  To this extent, an executive pay surtax can be seen as a corrective tax 
at seeks to reduce distortions that follow from market failure. 
IV. A TAX RESPONSE TO THE EXECUTIVE PAY PROBLEM: INVESTOR TAX RELIEF 
n by 
xecutives of excessive compensation.  This Part expands on the rationale for investor 
hould be considered in designing such relief. 
n on 
vestment.  If we think of excessive executive pay as being an economic tax on 
 Investor tax relief need not necessarily be tied to the imposition of a surtax.  Either 
project could be pursued independently.163  However, two considerations suggest that 
surtax on executive pay should discourage entry into the executive labor market.   
 
 However, this distortion in the executive labor market should be seen as offsetting 
a distortion that currently exists and thus as a positive, efficiency-enhancing aspect of 
a surtax approach.  One implication of this Article’s premise that executive 
compensation is inflated systematically as a result of deficiencies in the compensation-







 The second element of the proposal is investor tax relief, which is designed to 
mitigate the inefficient distortion of investment that follows from the extractio
e
tax relief and discusses factors that s
 
A. Why Investor Tax Relief? 
 
 As discussed in Part I, the extraction of excessive compensation by U.S. executives 
reduces shareholder returns and discourages investment in the corporate sector.  The 
primary idea behind channeling the proceeds of an executive pay surtax into investor 
tax relief is to offset the distortionary effects of excessive compensatio
in
investment, reducing actual investment taxes should mitigate the adverse effect. 
 
                                                 
 
163 Generally, it is a mistake to think of revenues from Pigovian taxes as being “free” money that is 
available to be directed to noble causes.  For example, environmental taxes may cause actors to 
internalize external costs, which is move in the direction of efficiency, but these taxes do make 
participants worse off.  See, e.g., James A. Mirrlees, Global Public Economics, in NEW SOURCES OF 
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 200 (A.B. Atkinson ed., 2004).  As a result, their revenues should not 
necessarily be directed towards “green” initiatives, if those initiatives would not have been pursued 
etitive
ND CORPORATE TAXATION 65 (Aug. 2010), 
absent the environmental tax.  However, the present case is somewhat different.  To the extent that an 
executive pay surtax simply extracts a portion of the rents received by executives, no one else is made 
worse off by the imposition of the tax.   
Of course, this does not mean that the revenue should be frittered away.  Any potential use of the 
revenue must compete with a reduction in other taxes that distort behavior, such as existing income 
taxes.  There is already a great deal of support for the idea of reducing corporate income tax rates in 
order to reduce distortions and enhance comp ness, and one could view the imposition of an 
executive pay surtax as an offset to a general corporate tax rate reduction.  See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT’S 
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linking the two might be advantageous.  First, as discussed in Part III, surtaxes might 
be partially offset by increases in executive pay.  To the extent that this occurs, the 
surtax would actually increase the drag on domestic corporate investment.  Refunding 
the surtax to investors would ensure that distortions in investment were not worsened 
by the imposition of a surtax.  If a surtax were to be fully refunded to investors, 
investors could be no worse off, in aggregate, as a result of the imposition of the 
surtax.  In all likelihood, a surtax would be at most partially passed on to employers, 
and investor tax relief would both cover the greater compensation expense arising 
from the surtax gross up and mitigate the effect of excessive executive compensation 
as it currently exists. 
 
 Second, a revenue neutral combination of a surtax and investor tax relief might be 
more politically palatable than either element alone.  Adding investor tax relief to the 
imposition of a surtax would defuse arguments that the surtax proposal is anti-business 
and might overcome the resistance of those opposed to tax increases generally.  
Adding the surtax to investor tax relief would provide a funding mechanism and 
deflate the opposition of deficit hawks.164 
 
 One might object that returning surtax proceeds to investors, a wealthy class on 
average, is taking money from the super rich and giving it to the merely rich, which is 
an odd way of combating the effect of excessive executive pay on income inequality.  
But the greatest growth in income inequality in the U.S. has been at the very highest 
end.  It lies in the top 0.1% of earners increasing their share of national income from 
2% to 8% over the last thirty years, and executives are more concentrated in that class 
than investors generally.165  Moreover, to the extent that excessive executive pay 
burdens labor through a shift away from public company investment, mitigating that 
investment distortion through investor tax relief would benefit labor indirectly.   
 
B. Investor Tax Relief Design Issues 
  
 Investor tax relief could take one of several forms.  Relief could be granted in the 
form of a reduction in the corporate income tax rate, or relief could be provided at the 
investor level, through a reduction in taxes on dividends or capital gains.  Relief could 
be general or firm-specific, ranging from a refundable corporate tax credit equal to the 
surtax collected from the executives at a particular company to a general reduction in 
the tax rate on qualified dividends.  This section discusses the factors that one would 
consider in designing investor tax relief to respond to the problems created by 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/PERAB_Tax_Reform_Report.pdf (noting that 
reduction in effective corporate tax rates would result in significant revenue losses absent efforts to 
broaden the tax base). 
 
 
164 Cf., Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn: A Proposed 
Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. REG. 1 (2010) (suggesting that a stabilizing 
surcharge on the price of oil be refunded to consumers in order to, inter alia, reduce political 
opposition). 
165 See supra note x and accompanying text. 
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excessive executive pay.  On balance, I conclude that corporate tax relief is the more 
us general corporate 
x relief are about even. 
investment in the corporate sector, but 
e degree to which this occurs and where the capital flows instead is not fully clear.  
ental taxes and excess 
xecutive pay, corporate tax relief should flow through to labor, as well.  However 
ecific and general corporate tax relief would be minimal.  Second, to 
e extent that the cost of excessive executive pay is passed on to non-corporate capital 
                                                
promising approach, but that the arguments for firm-specific vers
ta
 
1. Matching the Effect and Incidence of Pay Excesses 
 
 While shareholders bear the cost of excessive executive pay in the first instance, as 
discussed in Part II, the long-run incidence is less clear.  It also seems obvious that 
extraction of excess compensation discourages 
th
Ideally, investor tax relief would be matching in incidence and would reverse the 
distortions created by excessive executive pay. 
 
 Part II suggested that from an incidence perspective, the effect of excessive 
executive pay may be similar to that of a corporate level income tax.  If that is right, it 
would make sense to provide investor relief in the form of corporate income tax relief.  
We may not know exactly what fractions of incremental corporate taxes and excessive 
executive pay are borne by shareholders, non-corporate capital, and labor, but the 
fractions should be the same in the two cases.  Thus, if it is true that domestic labor 
ultimately bears the lion’s share of the burden of increm
e
capital allocations are distorted by the economic tax of excessive pay, those distortions 
should be mitigated by a reduction in corporate income taxes. 
 
 Of course, a general reduction in corporate tax rates would not mitigate the effects 
of excessive executive pay at companies that are effectively tax exempt because of 
large accumulated losses.166  And there is no reason to think that these firms would be 
immune from the effects of failure in the executive labor market.  Thus, to the extent 
that shareholders of a firm with a large loss position bear the cost of excessive 
executive pay, a general corporate tax rate reduction would provide little benefit.  
Firm-specific tax relief, e.g., a refundable corporate tax credit, would benefit 
shareholders in this instance.  For two reasons, however, this factor may not weigh 
greatly in favor of firm-specific relief.  First, for diversified shareholders the difference 
between firm-sp
th
or labor through a shift in equilibrium investing, again general corporate tax relief 
should suffice. 
 
 The effect of shareholder level tax relief, i.e., dividend tax relief, may also flow 
through to the factors of production that bear the cost of excessive executive pay, but 
 
 
166 Under U.S. tax laws, companies that generate losses are not entitled to receive money back from the 
government, but these companies are permitted to carry these losses – termed net operating losses or 
NOLs – backward and/or forward in time to offset taxable profits.  I.R.C § 172 (2006).  A company that 
has a large accumulated NOL position may have a low likelihood of paying taxes for a considerable 
number of years and thus a very low effective tax rate. 
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this is somewhat less clear.  Of course, even in the first instance, dividend tax relief 
would respond to the investment inhibiting effect of excess executive pay in only a 
very rough fashion.  Assuming that dividend tax relief had no impact on dividend 
practice, the relief would only benefit taxable individuals or entities investing in 
ividend paying companies.  Diversified taxable investors would see the benefit even 
nds, but diversification would not 
elp non-taxable investors in this respect. 
at investors 
id not suffer from the imposition of a surtax.  However, providing firm-specific relief 
ig
ss ups would come at the expense of 
oth taxable and non-taxable investors.  As a result, increasing surtax levels to 
it
ax 
to firm-specific tax relief.  For example, firms could be given a refundable corporate 
d
if some of their holdings failed to generate divide
h
 
2. Protection against Surtax Gross Ups 
 
 As discussed above, investor tax relief would be required to ensure that investment 
distortions resulting from excessive executive pay were not exacerbated by 
compensation gross ups in response to a surtax.  Gross up protection also has 
implications for the optimal design of investor tax relief.  Firm-specific relief, e.g., 
providing a refundable corporate tax credit equal to the surtax collected from the 
executives at a particular company, would be the safest way to ensure th
d
m ht encourage surtax gross ups if executives, boards, and investors more closely 
identify refunded amounts with the surtax collected from the executives.   
 
 Consider the suggestion in Part III that surtax rates could be increased to account 
for the likelihood of partial gross ups.  It was noted that any desired reduction in after-
tax executive pay generally could be achieved by increasing the surtax rate and that 
refunding surtax proceeds to investors generally would ensure that distortions in 
investment decisions resulting from extraction of excessive pay would be mitigated, 
not worsened.167  However, ramping up the surtax rate in the face of gross ups would 
increase pre-tax executive pay and this difference in nominal compensation would 
matter if investor tax relief were to be provided through a general reduction in 
marginal corporate income tax rates or general dividend tax relief.  The association 
between the corporate cost of gross ups and investor tax relief would be quite loose, 
and gross ups could result in winners and losers among investors.  Reducing the 
corporate tax rate would not benefit investors in effectively tax exempt firms, but these 
investors would bear the cost of grossed up executive pay.  Dividend tax relief would 
not benefit non-taxable investors, whereas gro
b
m igate shifting incidence of the surtax might be effective in aggregate, but might 
disadvantage some investors relative to others. 
 
 Inconsistency between investors could be minimized by closely linking the surt
                                                 
 
167 The second statement is strictly true as long as a firm’s corporate marginal tax rate equals or exceeds 
the executive’s marginal tax rate (excluding the surtax).  See supra note X and accompanying text. 
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tax credit equal to the surtax collected from executives at that firm.  This approach 
thus would be more 
menable to compensating the executives up for the surtax in this scenario than they 
 are heterogeneous, and many shareholders 
ight suffer the consequences of a surtax gross up but enjoy no relief from a reduced 
ds. 
tiations over tax rates.  This is 
artially a question of the relative magnitude of excess executive pay, dividends, and 
e for a surtax.  
                                                
would best ensure that investors were not harmed by the imposition of a surtax.168   
 
 Providing firm-specific relief, however, might have the unintended consequence of 
encouraging implicit gross ups if executives, boards, and perhaps even investors 
closely identify the corporate tax relief with the surtax collected.  For example, the 
following two investor tax relief strategies might have different effects on executive, 
board, and investor psychology, and thus on the outrage constraint.  First, suppose that 
the top corporate income tax rate for 2013 applicable to Acme Co. and all other U.S. 
corporations is reduced from 35% to 34.8% as a result of aggregate surtax collections 
in 2012.  Suppose Acme’s tax bill is reduced by $5 million.  Second, imagine that 
Acme is entitled to a $5 million refundable tax credit for 2013 based on the collection 
of $5 million in surtaxes from Acme executives in 2012.  One can imagine that 
Acme’s executives, directors, and investors might be more likely to view the firm-
specific refundable credit as being the “executives’ money,” and 
a
would be in the face of an across the board corporate tax rate cut. 
 
 If so, this factor might offset the investor protective feature of firm-specific relief 
to some degree.  Whether general or specific, corporate income tax relief appears to be 
superior to dividend tax relief when it comes to gross up protection.  As discussed in 
the previous subsection, dividend policies
m
rate of tax on their nonexistent dividen
 
3. Salience and Persistence 
 
 If investor tax relief were to be provided through a general reduction in corporate 
or shareholder level taxes, one might be concerned about whether the magnitude of a 
surtax-commensurate rate cut would be salient and/or whether the “refund” would 
disappear over time in the course of further nego
p
corporate income and partially a question of design. 
 
 Public company executive pay in excess of $1 million per executive is at least $20 
billion annually.169  Let us take this as a low end estimate of the tax bas
 
 
168 To be sure, this approach would not fully protect investors in firms with very low effective tax rates 
if executives achieved complete surtax gross ups.  Although the company would be entitled to a refund 
enefit from making this 
ax rates were cut generally to offset surtax receipts. 
ax credit with individual firm surtax proceeds would be somewhat analogous to 
of the surtax paid, the gross up would also reimburse the executive for tax at ordinary income rates on 
the gross up amount.  A firm with a low effective tax rate would see little tax b
payment, so there would be a net after-tax cost.  Nonetheless, investors in a firm with a low effective tax 
rate would fare much better in a regime of firm-specific refundable credits for surtaxes paid than in a 
regime in which corporate t
Matching a corporate t
the current matching of corporate deductions for compensation paid with employee inclusions.  See 
I.R.C. § 83(a)&(h) (2006). 
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By comparison, qualified dividends reported on taxable returns in 2008 totaled $141 
alient reduction in the taxation of investment returns but only 
 very modest reduction in the general corporate income tax that one might fear would 
e tax relief in 
ny year to the amount of surtax collected in the prior year.  In this way, the general 
eneral dividend relief is 
robably superior to general corporate tax relief.  However, it is possible to mitigate 
advantage through creative design. 
Several other issues might be considered in designing investor tax relief to mitigate 
e margin.  To this extent, both 
taxable and tax exempt investors might benefit as healthy dividend payouts 
may provide corporate governance benefits.172 
   
billion,170 and taxable corporate income is about $1 trillion per year.171   
 
 Assuming no change in behavior and simply to provide a ballpark estimate of 
orders of magnitude, a 10% surtax applied to executive pay in excess of $1 million per 
executive per year would generate about $2 billion.  This amount is roughly 
comparable to a one percentage point reduction in the tax rate on qualified dividends, 
which would cost the Treasury about $1.4 billion.  But $2 billion in surtax receipts 
would fund only about a 0.2% point reduction in the corporate tax rate, reducing the 
current top rate from 35% to 34.8%, for example.  A surtax on executive pay could 
fund a meaningful and s
a
be lost in the rounding. 
 
 Of course, a firm-specific corporate income tax credit tied to the surtax would not 
be hampered by the mis-match in magnitude between excess executive pay and 
corporate income.  Even without reverting to firm-specific relief, this difference in 
scale could be addressed by explicitly tying the general corporate incom
a
corporate tax relief would not be lost in negotiations over the rate. 
 
   In sum, from a salience and persistence perspective, g
p
the corporate tax relief dis
 
4. Other Issues 
 
 
the adverse effect of excessive executive pay. 
 
• Although the effect might be modest, dividend tax relief would encourage 
investment in dividend paying firms, larger payouts at dividend paying firms, 
and dividend payouts at more companies, at th
                                                                                                                                              
UE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME 2008 
 
 
169 See supra note X. 
170 STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, INTERNAL REVEN
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 42 tbl.1.4 (2008).  $141 billion of aggregate qualified dividends 
were reported on 21 million taxable returns.  Total aggregate qualified dividends of $159 billion were 
reported on 26 million taxable and non-taxable returns.     
171 STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME 2008 
CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 2 fig. A (2008) (estimating aggregate corporate income subject to 
tax of $1.25 trillion for 2007 and $0.98 trillion for 2008). 
172 Amy Dittmar & Jan Mahrt-Smith, Corporate Governance and the Value of Cash Holdings, 83 J. FIN. 
ECON. 599 (2007) (finding the market significantly discounts the value of cash-on-hand in poorly 
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• Firm-specific relief might be viewed as suggesting a level of precision in 
assessment of excessive compensation that executive pay critics would not 
claim.  It is impossible to determine how much executive pay is excessive at 
any given company and should be refunded to that company’s investors.  It is 
unlikely, of course, that any board would acknowledge that a portion of 
executive pay is excessive and that any surtax should be applied.   
 
• General investor tax relief, taking the form of a reduction in corporate tax rates 
or dividends, generally, seems more in keeping with the idea that executive pay 
is systematically higher across firms because managers with power over their 
own pay at a significant number of companies drive up the entire executive pay 
market.  As a result, investors in the corporate sector, non-corporate capital, 
and labor bear this cost, irrespective of the quality of corporate governance at 
any particular company.  Arguably, then, tax relief should be directed at 
corporate sector investors generally.    
 
• Providing general investor tax relief would be less administratively 
burdensome and less expensive than providing firm-specific relief, and the 
relatively modest sums at stake tend to make a low cost approach more 
desirable. 
    
 In sum, investor tax relief could take one of several forms.  There are pros and 
cons to general and firm-specific approaches and to approaches that are based on 
corporate income and dividends.  In my view, corporate income seems the more 
promising basis for investor tax relief and the case for general versus firm-specific 
corporate income tax relief seems about balanced.  Ultimately, political considerations 
would likely play as important a role as economic considerations in designing investor 
tax relief.   
 
 
V. REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
issue dividends in order to avoid future payout commitments); Pornsit Jiraporn, et al., Dividend Payouts 
and Corporate Governance Quality: An Empirical Investigation, 46 FIN. REV. 251 (2011) (finding firms 
with strong governance have a higher propensity to pay dividends). But see Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. 
Megan Partch, Do Persistent Large Cash Reserves Hinder Performance, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
 
 
governed firms); Jarrad Harford et al., Corporate Governance and Firm Cash Holdings in the US, 87 J. 
FIN. ECON. 535 (2008) (finding firms with weaker governance more likely to repurchase shares than 
ANALYSIS 275 (2003) (finding that the holding of large cash reserves promotes investment without 
hindering performance); Micah S. Officer, Dividend Policy, Dividend Initiations, and Governance (Oct. 
5, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.terry.uga.edu/finance/docs/officer.pdf) 
(finding predicted dividend payers with weak governance are more likely to pay dividends than 
predicted dividend payers with strong governance). 
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 This Part considers several alternative means of regulating executive compensation 
including direct, coercive regulation, enhanced disclosure, and a different form of tax 
e.  This Part concludes that the two pronged tax approach that has been the 
r to coercive regulation, which might be more effective 
ve 
nctions.  A “hard” cap would be the most effective way to limit executive pay, but 
ecutive pay levels are too 
igh systematically, we do not know the exact degree of excess pay and there is likely 
0 per year,  but I am not 
ware of any serious proposal to place a fixed dollar limit on total executive 
by the growing disparity between CEO pay and average worker pay, a number of 
commentators and legislators have proposed to limit CEO pay to a multiple of some 
measure of employee pay.176  However, these proposals still do not get at the scale 
                                                
incentiv
focus of this Article is superio
in limiting pay but could be highly inefficient, and to disclosure-based reforms or 
expansion of I.R.C. § 162(m), which are unlikely to be effective without being 
counterproductive. 
  
A. Coercive Regulation 
  
 Some commentators troubled by perceived excesses in executive compensation 
have proposed placing limits on executive pay that would be backed by coerci
sa
caps would also create significant distortions.  Even if ex
h
to be substantial heterogeneity in the amount of excess pay from firm to firm.  Thus, 
coercive regulation is likely to be highly inefficient relative to tax-based regulation. 
 
1. What Coercive Regulation Might Look Like 
 
 In general terms, caps on executive pay could be designed as fixed limitations or 
caps could be based on a formula, such as a multiple of median employee pay or 
company revenues.  The Obama administration proposed to limit the non-incentive 
compensation of TARP covered executives to $500,00 173
a
compensation.174  The most empirically robust determinant of executive pay is firm 
size,175 and given the huge differences in public company size and scope of 
managerial responsibility, it is readily apparent that a one-size-fits-all fixed limitation 
on total executive pay would not be a sensible regulatory option. 
 
 A formula-based limitation on executive pay would be more plausible.  Outraged 
 
 
173 See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on Executive 
Comp. (Feb. 4, 2009). 
174 The Obama administration proposal can be viewed as being analogous to I.R.C. § 162(m), which 
was designed to encourage the use of performance-based pay, rather than as an attempt to limit overall 
compensation.   
175 See supra note X and accompanying text [cross reference to Murphy (1999) on same point]. 
176 For example, Sen. Richard Durbin (D-IL) introduced legislation in 2009 that would have required a 
60 percent shareholder vote to authorize executive compensation in excess of 100 times average 
employee compensation.  See S. 1006, 111th Cong. (2009).  For many years, Rep. Martin Sabo (D-MN) 
introduced legislation that would have limited the deduction for employee compensation to an amount 
equal to 25 times the pay of the lowest paid employee.  Sabo has retired, but his legislation continues to 
be introduced in the House.  See, H.R. 382, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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problem.  Under a scheme such as this, the CEO of a small tech company populated 
with highly skilled and highly compensated engineers could be paid more than the 
EO of a massive company with a large population of relatively low paid workers, 
sure of firm size such as 
ssets, revenue, or market capitalization.  It is also possible that a formula would 
 that without performance incentives 
xecutives would tend to act in a much more risk averse fashion than their typically 
 CEO 
hose firm most outperformed market expectations (as incorporated in the firm’s 
regulation over pay caps.  The realized value of compensation is relatively easy to 
determine with precision (and to tax).  The ex ante value of some forms of pay – stock 
                                                
C
such as Exxon.177 
 
 More plausible still would be a formula tied to some mea
178a
provide for adjustments based on company performance.179   
 
 Dietl, Duschl, and Lang stress the importance of maintaining performance 
incentives within a salary cap system.  Absent performance incentives, executives 
would be motivated to perform well only by the prospect of losing their (salary 
capped) positions.  One would also expect
e
well-diversified shareholders would prefer.180 
 
 Maintaining performance incentives within a “salary cap” system is not 
conceptually difficult.  The key would be to limit the ex ante value of executive pay, 
but to allow and encourage firms to provide performance-based pay.  Suppose, for 
example, that three companies each issued stock options to their CEOs with ex ante 
expected value of $5 million, the limit set by their pay cap formulas.181  The
w
share price at the time of option grant) would receive the largest ex post payoff. 
 
 Once one moves beyond salary, however, limitations on ex ante pay become more 
difficult to enforce, and this enforcement concern suggests one advantage of tax-based 
 
 
177 Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for B and Four Hundred for C: The Widening Gap in Pay Between 
Executives and Rank and File Employees, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 115, 161 (2002) (rejecting a pay 
ratio cap because of the one-size-fits-all problem and other limitations). 
178 English, French, and German heads of state have discussed the imposition of CEO salary caps and 
the possibility of linking caps to company performance.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Stinson, As CEO Pay in 
Europe Rises, So Does Talk of Curbing It, USA TODAY, June 30, 2008, 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2008-06-29-europe-ceo-pay_N.htm.  
179 Helmut M. Dietl et al., Executive Pay Regulation: What Regulators, Shareholders, and Managers 
Can Learn from Major Sports Leagues, 13 BUS. & POL., Issue 2, art.6 at 18-19 (2011), 
http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol13/iss2/art6/. 
180 In addition to their human capital, corporate executives tend to have a disproportionate fraction of 
their financial capital invested in their firms.  Shareholders, on the other hand, tend to be diversified.  
Absent incentives for risk-taking, executives would tend to be more conservative in their choices 
regarding project selection and similar matters than their shareholders would prefer.  This mis-match in 
risk preferences was the rationale for the introduction of stock option compensation as well as the 
adoption of I.R.C. § 162(m).  See John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A 
Survey, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, 33 (discussing the use of stock options to 
overcome managerial risk aversion); Polsky, supra note X, at 889-90 (same). 
181 Valuation could be determined utilizing the Black-Scholes option pricing model. 
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options and SARs, in particular – requires calculations which involve manipulable 
inputs.182   
  
 A hard cap on executive pay, whether formula based or not, presumably would be 
backed by significant sanctions for failure to comply.  As it recently did in the case of 
several provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act,183 Congress might direct the SEC to require 
the stock exchanges to delist firms that failed to comply with executive pay caps.  
Alternatively, Congress could impose such sufficiently severe financial penalties that 
it would be virtually impossible for firms to exceed the pay caps. 
 
2. Pros and Cons of Coercive Regulation (Relative to Tax) 
 
 A significant advantage to coercive regulation in a context in which executives 
exert substantial influence over their own pay is that a hard cap precludes any 
possibility of a gross up.  As long as all avenues of compensation can be identified and 
reasonably valued,184 a hard cap would effectively limit executive pay and thus would 
most effectively address the impact of excessive pay on the distortion of investment 
decisions, the growing inequality of wealth, and the distortion in entry into the 
executive labor market.   
 
 Although a hard cap on executive pay would not be susceptible to being grossed 
up through conventional compensation, firms and executives would undoubtedly seek 
out ways of transferring value to executives that would not be subject to the cap.  
Despite investor sensitivity to executive perks, one would imagine that we would 
observe much greater use of corporate supplied housing, cars, and vacations disguised 
as business travel if these benefits were not appropriately valued and included in 
income subject to the cap.  A hard cap would result in much greater pressure on 
avoidance of this type than would a surtax that allows compensation above a 
threshold, but extracts a portion thereof.   
 
3. The Inefficiency of Coercive Regulation More Generally (Relative to 
Tax)  
                                                 
 
182 See David I. Walker & Victor Fleischer, Book/Tax Conformity and Equity Compensation, 62 TAX L. 
REV. 399, 431-32 (2009). 
Another difficulty with this approach is that executives demand to be compensated for taking on risk.  
Unless salary caps were risk adjusted, the imposition of caps would actually encourage firms to move in 
the direction of “safe” pay, e.g., salary and easily achievable bonuses, in order to maximize the 
subjective value of pay packages to executives within the constraints of the caps.  See Hall & Murphy, 
supra note X, at 5 (explaining that non-diversified executives value stock options below their cost to 
shareholders). 
183 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 952(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-
3(a)(1) (West 2010) (setting forth independence requirements for members of public company 
compensation committees and requiring the SEC to direct the exchanges to prohibit the listing of any 
equity security of a company that fails to comply with these independence requirements). 
184 As noted above, a cap based on the grant date value of pay would leave some room for manipulation 
and gaming, but there can be no doubt that a cap on pay would be more effective than a surtax in 
limiting executive value extraction through excessive compensation. 
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 A hard cap on executive pay (whether a fixed amount or a formula based approach 
that would reflect differences in firm size and incorporate performance incentives) 
backed by severe financial penalties is an example of what economist Robert Cooter 
refers to as a sanction.185  A surtax on executive pay above a certain threshold is a 
price in his terminology.  The fundamental difference between the two and the primary 
reason that caps are likely to be an inferior approach to regulating executive pay is that 
sanctions are more distorting of behavior.  As Cooter suggests, most actors comply 
with a standard that takes the form of a sanction.  If firms that paid executives in 
excess of $5 million per year faced certain and severe financial penalties, few would 
pay in excess of $5 million per year.  Taxes, or more generally, prices allow actors to 
optimize over the cost of paying the tax or adjusting their behavior.186  Prices result in 
greater freedom of behavior and less distortion.   
 
 The problem for coercive regulation is one of information.187  If a regulator could 
easily determine the optimal level of activity or precaution, a sanction might be the 
best regulatory response.  In such a case, we want to distort behavior. However, in 
cases in which the regulator observes market failure but in which it is difficult to 
determine the efficient level of activity or precaution that is being regulated, the 
distortion created by a sanction can be very inefficient.188  If we believe executive pay 
is excessive, but we do not know the optimal level of pay, a price or tax is likely to be 
the superior regulatory response. 
 
 It would be extraordinarily difficult for a regulator to determine the optimal level 
of executive pay or to produce a formula for determining that level at any particular 
firm.  As commentators have noted, it is almost impossible for external observers to 
evaluate pay levels at particular firms even ex post,189 which is, perhaps, the primary 
reason that the courts have been so hesitant to find that litigated pay levels are 
excessive.190  Coming up with an ex ante formula to limit executive pay across the 
board would be even more difficult.  There is undoubtedly substantial heterogeneity in 
the optimal level of pay at U.S. companies even after controlling for firm size, 
industry, etc.  To be sure, a tax response to excessive pay also requires a threshold or 
thresholds, which could also be formula based.  The difference is that, for the reasons 
                                                 
 
185 Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1524-25 (1984). 
186 Alberto Alesina & Francesco Passarelli, Regulation versus Taxation 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 16413, 2010).  
187 Cf. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 
4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2002) (demonstrating that corrective taxes are superior to direct regulation of 
externality generating activities when the regulator’s information regarding the costs of mitigating those 
externalities is incomplete). 
188 Cooter, supra note X, at 1531. 
189 Stabile, supra note X, at 97. 
190 Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in 
Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 605 (2001) (concluding that courts are reluctant “to enter into the 
business of determining what constitute reasonable levels of compensation”). 
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Cooter described, the cost of getting the threshold wrong is very much lower in the 
case of a tax. 
 
 A cap on executive pay that had any real teeth would have several pernicious 
effects.  First, a cap would tend to drive talented individuals out of the sector, leaving 
less talented individuals with fewer outside opportunities behind to manage our largest 
companies.191  Second, pay-capped executives who remained would tend to work less 
and consume more leisure.192  This effect might be mitigated by utilizing caps on ex 
ante pay that permit the use of performance-based compensation, but as noted above, 
enforcement costs would increase in this scenario.  Third, pay caps – even 
sophisticated performance and size-based caps – would lead to an inefficient allocation 
of talent.  Dietl, Duschl, and Lang analogize to professional sports.  From an 
efficiency standpoint, we want the most talented players to play for the teams with 
highest marginal returns on talent.193  These are not necessarily the highest revenue 
teams, although there is probably a strong correlation.  Fourth, while size- and 
performance-based caps seem superior to fixed dollar caps, adopting more 
sophisticated caps would have unintended consequences. I have already noted the 
potential option value manipulation problem, but caps like these could have more 
serious real world effects.  For example, if pay caps are based on firm size, executives 
would have a greater incentive than today to engage in empire building, even at the 
expense of shareholder value.194  Fifth, the imposition of pay caps with real bite might 
cause some U.S. companies and/or U.S. executives to repatriate overseas, if so doing 
would allow the executives to avoid the regulation and would result in a superior mix 
of compensation, taxes, services, and amenities.195     
                                                 
 
191 Rafael D’Oliveira et al., Should the Government Regulate CEO Pay At Top TARP Firms? (Univ. 
Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus. Econ. Analysis of Major Policy Issues No. 33111, 2010) available at 
http://works.bepress.com/karl_muth/18. 
192 Id. 
193 Dietl et al., supra note X, at 20-21. 
194 Executives’ personal incentives to grow their businesses are already substantial.  As noted, 
compensation is clearly correlated with firm size.  See supra note X and accompanying text. Executive 
roles at larger firms are more prestigious.  In addition, larger firms may be less vulnerable to takeover 
threats.  Brent W. Ambrose & William L. Megginson, The Role of Asset Structure, Ownership 
Structure, and Takeover Defenses in Determining Acquisition Likelihood, 27 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 575, 581-82 (1992) (finding the probability of receiving a takeover bid is negatively related 
to firm size); Mary M. Bange & Michael A. Mazzeo, Board Composition, Board Effectiveness, and the 
Observed Form of Takeover Bids, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 1185, 1190 (2004) (finding that takeover offer 
premiums are negatively related to firm size); Paul Barnes, Predicting UK Takeover Targets: Some 
Methodological Issues and an Empirical Study, 12 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 283, 291 (1999) 
(finding the likelihood of acquisition decreases with size); Randall Morck et al., Alternative 
Mechanisms for Corporate Control, 79 AMER. ECON. REV. 842, 848 (1989) (same); David Offenberg, 
Firm Size and the Effectiveness of the Market for Corporate Control, 15 J. CORP. FIN. 66, 67 (2009) 
(same); Krishna G. Palepu, Predicting Takeover Targets A Methodological and Empirical Analysis, 8 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 3, 23 tbl.3 (1986) (finding empirical support, significant at the 0.05 level, for same). But 
see Gerald F. Davis & Suzanne K. Stout, Organization Theory and the Market for Corporate Control: A 
Dynamic Analysis of the Characteristics of Large Takeover Targets 1980-1990, 37 Admin. Sci. Q. 605, 
605 (1992); (finding large corporations more likely to be taken over). 
195 Some companies claim that high U.S. taxes have contributed to their decisions to reincorporate 
abroad.  Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and 
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 These are serious concerns, and it seems likely that if Congress were to adopt 
executive pay caps it would set the caps at a fairly high level so as to minimize these 
distortions.  That result could well be worse than doing nothing.  Any cap that is 
placed on executive pay – whether formula based or a fixed dollar amount – is likely 
to become a target as did the $1 million “cap” imposed by § 162(m). 196  If a cap were 
to be enacted at the high range of current pay so as to limit the inefficiency associated 
with one-size-fits-all compulsory regulation, the cap would serve as an invitation to 
raise pay for executives at the majority of firms, at which existing pay levels would be 
below the cap, as well as serving as a constraint on pay for the minority of firms, 
where current pay levels would equal or exceed the cap.   
 
 To be sure, a surtax on executive pay would also require a threshold that would 
serve as a target, and a surtax could also produce pernicious effects.  But both 
concerns would be much reduced in the case of a surtax.  Ideally, most firms would 
not adjust compensation following the imposition of a surtax, and the surtax would 
simply pull back a portion of the rents that are extracted by executives, but firms 
would have latitude to make individualized choices regarding executive pay levels that 
would be precluded by a cap.  Moreover, because a surtax would be just that – a tax – 
rather than a limitation, there would be less risk in adopting a low threshold for the 
tax, such as $1 million per year.  Few senior executives of the large public companies 
in which the pay setting process is suspect earn less than $1 million per year.  As a 
result, the potential cost of creating a compensation focal point through the imposition 
of this surtax should be modest.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 409 (2002) (finding some large American 
corporations with extensive foreign assets try to avoid U.S. income taxes on their foreign income by 
“inverting” their corporate structure so as to make the former U.S. parent company a subsidiary of one 
of its former foreign subsidiaries); Johannes Voget, Relocation of Headquarters and International 
Taxation, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1067 (2011) (finding foreign repatriation taxes have a significant, positive 
effect on the probability that a multinational firm “relocates”); Robert J. Herbold & Scott S. Powell, Op-
Ed., Tax Laws Chasing Companies Away, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 20, 2009, at B10 (retired COO of 
Microsoft and an executive consultant arguing America’s high corporate tax rates and taxation on 
foreign source income, inter alia, are forcing many U.S. companies to reincorporate overseas); Orsolya 
Kun, A Broader View of Corporate Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate and Economic 
Implications (bepress Legal Series, Working Paper No. 78, 2003), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/78 (finding corporate inversions to minimize U.S. taxation on 
worldwide income substantially reduce the accountability of directors and officers and create significant 
impediments to the enforcement of shareholder rights). Individual executive repatriation would be more 
disruptive, and given generally lower levels of executive pay outside the U.S., it is not clear how much 
more pay U.S. executives could obtain by relocating abroad.  The benefit of relocation would depend in 
large part on the severity of pay caps.  Nonetheless, the imposition of significant pay caps would 
provide compelling motivation for executives to explore overseas alternatives.   
196 See David G. Harris & Jane R. Livingstone, Federal Tax Legislation as an Implicit Contracting Cost 
Benchmark: The Definition of Excessive Executive Compensation, 77 ACCT. REV. 997 (2002) (finding 
that firms that paid their CEOs less than $1 million prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 162(m) increased 
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 But, one might object, doesn’t the foregoing parade of horribles that I have 
associated with pay caps ignore this Article’s premise that the executive labor market 
is flawed and that pay levels are systematically inflated today?  Well, yes and no.  
Clearly, the impact of a pay cap on executive flight from the corporate sector depends 
on the amount of rent that is being extracted today.  Just as LeBron James is unlikely 
to quit playing basketball if his pay is capped at 75% of current earnings, highly 
talented corporate executives who extract substantial rents are unlikely to move on as a 
result of a cap.  On the other hand, the existence of substantial rents is unlikely to 
mitigate the enhanced empire building incentive.  More fundamentally, the working 
premise of this Article does not imply that excessive executive pay is uniform.  There 
is likely to be substantial heterogeneity, such that any pay cap arrangement that has 
teeth would implicate the concerns listed above at a sizeable number of firms. 
 
B. Enhanced Disclosure 
 
 Over the last 20 years, the most popular regulatory response to perceived executive 
pay problems has been enhanced SEC disclosure requirements.  The SEC has labored 
hard to ensure that pay disclosure for top corporate executives is comprehensive and 
transparent, and they have largely achieved that goal.  New rules adopted in 2009 
finally provide a comprehensive measure of the total grant date value of executive pay 
packages that is both reasonably accurate and comparable from firm to firm.197 
 
 As noted above, enhanced SEC disclosure requirements may have contributed to 
upward ratcheting of executive pay,198 but the general Brandeis-ian idea that sunlight 
is the best disinfectant remains sound.199  The problem in this context is that disclosure 
can at best provide discipline with respect to compensation that is excessive on a 
relative basis.  The innovation of requiring regular shareholder advisory voting on 
executive pay practices can potentially sharpen this discipline,200 but, because it is 
very difficult to assess executive pay levels on an absolute basis, disclosure and 
shareholder “say on pay” votes are unlikely to have any significant effect on 
systematically excessive pay levels that are the focus of this Article. 
 
C. Amend I.R.C. § 162(m) 
 
 An alternative tax-based approach to addressing systematically excessive 
executive pay would be to amend or replace I.R.C. §162(m) with an overall limitation 
on the amount of senior executive pay that is deductible, with no exceptions for 
                                                 
 
197 David I. Walker, The Law and Economics of Executive Compensation: Theory and Evidence, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell eds., 
Elgar Press, forthcoming 2011). 
198 See supra note X and accompanying text. 
199 LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).  
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performance-based pay, or anything else.  For several reasons, however, this does not 
seem a promising approach. 
 
 First, imagine an overall cap on deductible pay of $1 million per executive per year 
– the current limitation on non-performance based pay.  Our experience with the 
current § 162(m) suggests that this sort of tax penalty would likely be ignored with 
respect to highly paid executives at the majority of firms.  Although most companies 
initially reacted to the enactment of § 162(m) by limiting non-performance based pay 
to $1 million per executive per year, today firms routinely exceed this limitation, 
providing salaries and other non-performance based pay well in excess of the $1 
million threshold.201  In their proxy statements, these firms typically state that 
deductibility is only one factor that the board considers in executive pay 
deliberations.202  This is an interesting development, because it is generally considered 
to be relatively easy to qualify pay as deductible under § 162(m) by, for example, 
providing bonus opportunities with easily achievable targets.203  In a tax world in 
which there were no performance-based exceptions to a $1 million cap on deductible 
pay, it seems likely that firms would simply dismiss the limitation as unreasonably 
low. 
 
 Thus, it is unlikely that the expanded reach of a $1 million limitation on 
deductibility would significantly reduce executive pay.  It would, however, raise 
revenue, reduce shareholder returns, and increase the disincentive to invest in the 
corporate sector.  To the extent that the expanded deduction limitation did not impact 
pay levels, it would be equivalent to an increase in the corporate tax rate.   
                                                 
 
201 For example, 62% of the 200 large, public company CEOs whose 2009 compensation was analyzed 
by Equilar, an executive compensation research firm, received base salary in excess of $1 million.  See 
CEO Pay: The Tables, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2010, § BU, at 10-11. 
202 Apple Inc., Proxy Statement (Form Def. 14A), at 29 (Jan. 7, 2011) (“While the Compensation 
Committee considers the deductibility of awards as one factor in determining executive compensation, 
the Committee also looks at other factors in making its decisions . . . .”); Exxon Mobil Corp., Proxy 
Statement (Form Def. 14A), at 41 (Apr. 13, 2011) (“The primary drivers for determining the amount 
and form of executive compensation are the retention and motivation of superior executive talent rather 
than the Internal Revenue Code.”); Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Proxy Statement (Form Def. 14A), at 37 (Apr. 
18, 2011) (“[Committee] retains the ability to pay appropriate compensation, even if our company may 
not be able to deduct all of that compensation under federal tax laws.”) 
203 E.g., Jack S. Levin, Code Section 162(m) - $1 Million Deduction Limit on Executive Compensation, 
63 Tax Notes 723, 731-42 (1994) (discussing the substantial ambiguities in I.R.C. § 162(m) and in the 
1.162-27 regulations, and proposing language that would ameliorate many of the statutory and 
regulatory problems); Scott P. Spector, Executive Compensation Strategy, Design and Implementation, 
June 15, 2006, 741 PLI/TAX 13, 59 (2006) (describing how “fairly easily attained goals” can 
nevertheless be structured to give rise to deductible performance based compensation). However the 
IRS has recently proposed regulations that would somewhat tighten the performance-based 
compensation requirements. Certain Employee Remuneration in Excess of $1,000,000 Under Internal 
Revenue Code Section 162(m), 76 Fed. Reg. 37034 (proposed June 24, 2011) (to be codified at 26 
C.F.R. 1.162-27) (requiring performance-based compensation plans to specify the maximum number of 
shares or options to be granted to any one employee at the time the plan is approved by shareholders, 
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 Of course, in broadening § 162(m) in the fashion contemplated herein, Congress 
might reasonably increase the threshold to reflect current pay practices.  As noted 
above, median compensation of large firm CEOs was over $9 million for 2010.204  
Suppose Congress were to adopt a deductibility limit of $10 million per executive per 
year.  A deductibility cap of that magnitude might have some effect on curtailing 
executive pay.  However, a one size fits all limitation of this sort would be inefficient 
for the reasons discussed in Part V.  In addition, as we saw with the adoption of the 
present § 162(m) in 1993, a relatively high threshold might serve more as a target for 







 Given the risk of gross ups, the superiority of a tax response to the executive pay 
problem is not unambiguous.  Nonetheless, the combination of a surtax placed on high 
levels of executive pay and corporate tax relief seems the most promising means of 
reducing executive after-tax incomes and ameliorating the distortions in investment 
created by excessive pay without incurring the risks and unintended consequences of 
direct, coercive regulation.  Let me conclude, however, by suggesting a very different 
tack one might take with the data, analyses, and arguments that have been presented in 
this Article. 
  
 Given the growth in income inequality in this country, particularly at the high end 
of the income distribution, and what appears to be a looming fiscal crisis, several 
commentators have proposed increasing marginal tax rates for high income individuals 
generally.205  Several commentators have floated the idea of a “millionaires’ tax,” by 
which they really mean a surtax on annual incomes in excess of $1 million per year.206   
 
 Taking this broader perspective, one could argue that deficiencies in the executive 
labor market resulting in rents for corporate executives represent an additional 
justification for levying a general surtax on high income individuals.207  This 
                                                 
 
204 See supra note X and accompanying text. 
205 Warren Buffett, Op-Ed., Stop Coddling the Super-Rich, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2011, at A21; James 
Surowiecki, Soak the Very, Very Rich, NEW YORKER, Aug. 16, 2010 at 33; Thomas Piketty, Proposer’s 
Opening Remarks, Economist Debates: Resenting the Rich, ECONOMIST.COM, Apr. 7, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/293.  
206 Buffett, supra note X, at A21; Robert Frank & Laura Sanders, The Battle Over the Millionaire’s Tax, 
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Mar. 26, 2011, http://wsj.com (search “Millionaire’s Tax”); Surowiecki, supra 
note X, at 33.  A Quinnipiac University poll found broad support for a “millionaire’s tax,” even among 
Republicans.  See Press Release, Quinnipiac University, New York Voters Back Millionaires Tax 4-1, 
Quinnipiac University Poll Finds; Most Voters Back Higher Tax on People Making $250,000 (Feb. 18, 
2009), http://www. quinnipiac.edu/x1318.xml?ReleaseID=1265. 
207 Saugato Datta, Moderator’s Rebuttal Remarks, Economist Debates: Resenting the Rich, 
ECONOMIST.COM, Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/294 (noting that, if true, 
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justification would extend to private company executives and even non-profit 
executives to the extent that these labor markets are infected by excess pay received by 
public company executives.  Of course, this justification would apply only to a subset 
of high income individuals.  The income of sports stars and entertainers may also 
include rents, but there is no reason to think that their compensation does not result 
from an efficient labor market.  As we have seen, however, the subset of high income 
individuals to whom this rationale would apply is larger than we previously believed.  
Public and private company executives could account for one-third or more of 
individuals in the top 0.1% of the income distribution.208 
 
 More broadly based taxes generally are better (less distorting) than more narrowly 
based taxes,209 and expanding the surtax to all high income individuals would have 
several clear advantages over a surtax limited to excessive executive pay.  Although 
companies could still increase executive pay to offset the effect of a general surtax on 
income in excess of $1 million per year, one would think that a general increase in tax 
rates would be less likely to be grossed up than a surtax directed specifically at 
executive pay.210  Given a lesser risk of gross ups, there would be less of an imperative 
to refund the surtax collected from executives to investors.  In other words, if a general 
millionaires’ tax were to be imposed, investor tax relief probably would have to stand 
on its own bottom. 
 
 In addition, expanding the surtax to all high income individuals might mitigate 
certain distortions and avoidance maneuvers, such as attempts to defer compensation 
to a period in which an individual would no longer be subject to an executive pay 
surtax.  The imposition of a millionaires’ surtax would also eliminate any difficulty in 
identifying the membership of the surtaxed group.211 
 
 Finally, one might think that an advantage to a general millionaires’ tax over an 
executive pay surtax would be that the former would do less to distort career decisions.  
However, if one accepts the view put forward above that the executive labor market is 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
the argument “that there is a market failure in the way top compensation is decided…provides a 
rationale for higher taxation of the rich separate from concerns about inequality”). 
208 Bakija et al, supra note X, at 51 tbl.3. 
209 This is true because a more narrowly based tax is (generally) more avoidable through substitution, 
and thus results in greater distortions in behavior.  Distorted behavior resulting from taxation is, of 
course, the root source of taxation inefficiency. See ROSEN, supra note X, at 292. 
210 I base this assumption on the lack of empirical evidence that executives pass on the effect of general 
rate increases, supra note X and accompanying text, and on the idea that the imposition of a 
millionaires’ tax would be less likely to loosen the outrage constraint than a tax directed specifically at 
executive pay. 
211 On the other hand, if a general millionaires’ surtax results in top individual rates significantly 
exceeding corporate tax rates, the C corporation may once again become a tax shelter allowing closely 
held businesses to defer and reduce effective taxes.  See Daniel Halperin, Mitigating the Potential 
Inequity of Reducing Corporate Rates (Tax Policy Center Working Paper, July 29, 2009) (discussing 
the potential C corporation shelter issue and recommending fixes).  The executive pay surtax proposed 
herein does not appear to implicate these issues. 
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already distorted by the existence of excessive compensation, a modest surtax limited 
to executive pay would reduce long-term labor supply distortions rather than create 
them.  The imposition of a millionaires’ tax instead would simply preserve the existing 
distortions in the executive labor market.   
 
 To be sure, it is somewhat unfair to compare an executive pay surtax to a general 
millionaires’ surtax.  The exercise has an apples to oranges quality.  Moreover, while 
the proposal put forward in this Article addresses the executive pay problem from both 
ends, a millionaire’s surtax would do nothing to ameliorate the distortion in capital 
allocation that results from excessive executive pay.  In my view, these are both 
projects worth pursuing.  As long as top total marginal federal rates remained in the 
vicinity of 50%, I could well imagine doing both.    
 
   
